


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4 December 1979

East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1743



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HUNGARIAN MINORITY ASKS SLOVAK GOVERNMENT, CHARTISTS FOR SUPPORT

'IRODALMI UJSAG' Comments

Paris IRODALMI UJSAG in Hungarian Nos 9-10, Sep-Oct 79 p 1

[Text] Hungarian democrats in Slovakia formed in early 1978 the Hungarian Nationality Rights Defense Committee in Czechoslovakia [HNRDC in CZ] in Czechoslovakia. Within a year they prepared three documents in which they listed their demands and protested against the oppression of the Hungarians living in Slovakia and against the Slovak communist leadership's measures and assimilation plans.

The third document, prepared in May 1979, was delivered to supporters of Charter 77, the bravest and most consistent defenders of human rights in Czechoslovakia today.

There are nearly 600,000 Hungarians in Slovakia. The document, which IRODALMI UJSAG is publishing below, and the accompanying letter to Charter 77 demonstrate with practically dry professionalism that the Hungarian minority's situation is grave, that its already minimal civil and nationality rights are in growing jeopardy; and they list with the same thoroughness the Hungarians' demands. As a courtesy to the addressees, the documents were prepared in Slovak, and our paper is publishing the Hungarian translations.

The fact that the Hungarians of Slovakia, subjected to discriminatory measures, extend their hand to Charter 77 and place their trust in this movement again vindicates the Hungarian 34 who in January 1977 expressed their solidarity with the Czechoslovak protest movement (cf IRODALMI UJSAG, Jan-Feb 1977).

Simultaneously, the document of the [HNRDC] in Czechoslovakia regrettably confirms also that the present Hungarian regime--just as in the case of the Hungarians in Transylvania--is not performing its basic duty of protecting the Hungarians in Slovakia. There is less excuse for this because the Husak regime--unlike Ceaurescu's Romania--depends entirely on Moscow, and thus it would be much easier for the Hungarian leadership that is loyal to Moscow to achieve Soviet intervention.

Memorandum to Charter 77 Supporters

Paris IRODALMI UJSAG in Hungarian Nos 9-10, Sep-Oct 79 p 1

[Text] Dear Friends:

We wish to acquaint you with the memorandum of the Hungarian Nationality Rights Defense Committee in Czechoslovakia [HNRDC in CZ], the third in the series of documents prepared by this committee.

The committee was formed in early 1978, for the defense of the vital interests and rights of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia. At that time we learned of the Slovak state and party leaders' intention to gradually liquidate the Hungarian schools; as the first step, they wanted to abolish Hungarian as the language of instruction from the fifth grade on of the basic schools.

To save this institution of fundamental importance, we organized a protest drive among the population of Hungarian nationality, and through the press we informed foreign public opinion. In this way we were able to arrest for a time the attack against Hungarian schools.

A few months later, the Slovak Socialist Republic's Ministry of Education --with the support of the CPSL Central Committee secretary for ideological affairs--submitted a new plan that was practically identical with the previous one. This led the committee to issue its second protest document, in January 1979. We sent this document to all high-ranking Slovak and federal party and state leaders. We know from reliable sources that several countries' embassies in Czechoslovakia also were informed of the content of our protest, independently of us. As a result of this protest drive, the campaign against Hungarian schools was again halted.

Since then, however, we have been able to ascertain that leading Slovak personalities have not abandoned their dream of assimilating the Hungarian nationality and are merely seeking other ways of achieving their objectives. Mostly through the instruments of political and mental pressure, they are striving to void even the minimal rights that the constitution guarantees for the Hungarian minority.

We are releasing our memorandum to point out the basic shortcomings in the situation of the nationalities, and to remind the state leaders and our fellow citizens of the need to perfect constitutional rights.

We regard the oppression of nationalities as a violation of the fundamental human rights and, in our case, also a violation of the civil rights guaranteed by the constitution.

We hope that the attached document may serve as the basis for establishing contact between Charter 77 and the Hungarian Nationality Rights Defense Committee in Czechoslovakia. We request your reply through the same channel that our letter was delivered to you, or through any other channel of your choice.

May 1979.

Sincerely yours,
The Committee

Demands of Rights Committee

Paris IRODALMI UJSAG in Hungarian Nos 9-10, Sep-Oct 79 pp 1, 2, 4

[Text] The revised Czechoslovak constitution, as Constitutional Law No 100/1960 Sb, as well as Constitutional Law No 143/1968 Sb Concerning the Czechoslovak Federation, and Constitutional Law No 144/1968 Sb Concerning Nationalities, which defines the status of the nationalities living on the territory of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, became effective ten years ago.

However, implementation of Constitutional Law No 144/1968 Sb has not fulfilled the expectations of the nationalities, for the following reasons:

1. It has not ensured the nationalities' social, economic and cultural development, and elimination of the lag that occurred since 1945 in comparison with the Czech and Slovak nations;
2. It has not ensured proportional development of nationalities' schools at the various levels of the educational system;
3. It has not ensured the nationalities' collective participation in the state's political life;
4. It has not ended the process of assimilating the nationalities by force.

In recent years, neither the Federal National Assembly nor the Slovak National Council has enacted implementing statutes that would ensure realization of the principles embodied in the constitutional law.

As a result of the preceding, the principles embodied in the constitutional law have been degraded gradually, and the institutional possibilities for the nationalities' independent advancement have gradually been limited. This has affected the most sensitively the largest nationality, the Hungarians.

In the situation that developed in this manner, the following acts of discrimination can be ascertained:

I. In the area of education:

No Hungarian day nurseries have been established;

The network of Hungarian kindergartens is inadequate;

The number of schools in which the language of instruction is Hungarian has declined;

The number of classrooms in such schools has declined;

Enrollment in the basic schools where the language of instruction is Hungarian has declined (by about 31 percent) in relation to the number of school-age children of Hungarian nationality;

Attempts have been made to change to Slovak the language of instruction in the Hungarian schools;

In the vocational secondary schools and in the institutes for vocational training there are not enough opportunities for vocational training in Hungarian;

The Hungarian section of the Pedagogical Faculty in Nitra has practically been liquidated, thereby ending the training of Hungarian teachers for Hungarian schools;

The proportion of students of Hungarian nationality enrolled in the universities and colleges of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is low;

Study at higher educational institutions in Hungary and the gaining of scientific degrees there have been restricted;

As a result of all this, the gap between the cultural level of the Hungarian minority and that of the Slovak majority has widened.

II. In the area of cultural life:

Satisfaction of the cultural needs of citizens who are of Hungarian nationality is being restricted intentionally to the amateur movement and fiction;

Cultural development of citizens who are of Hungarian nationality is being limited intentionally, through below-average subsidies for the Hungarian cultural institutions;

Development of the Hungarian nationality's book culture is being paralyzed intentionally, by limiting the opportunities to publish in the native language (for example, a significant proportion of the Madach Publishing House's capacity has been reserved for translated literature);

Development of Hungarian newspapers and periodicals is being limited, and the assortment of Hungarian-language periodicals on the territory where the Hungarian minority is living is inadequate;

The number of books imported from the Hungarian People's Republic has declined; the Hungarian books published in Romania, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and elsewhere are not placed on the market; and the customs authorities restrict the private importation of books from abroad, particularly from the dollar area, which conflicts with the spirit of the agreement signed in Helsinki in 1975;

The prices of books imported from the Hungarian People's Republic have been raised (by about 53 percent);

Development of the official Hungarian theater is being limited;

Adult education in the Hungarian language is being limited;

Establishment of an independent social-science institute for the needs of the Hungarians living in Czechoslovakia has not been authorized.

III. In the economy:

Economic development of the areas occupied by the Hungarian nationality is not harmonic;

Industrialization of these areas is not systematic, and thus industrialization promotes the assimilation of Hungarians;

Long-range training of experts is inadequate from among Hungarian youths and for the needs of the industries established in these areas;

A larger proportion of the Hungarian population commutes from the okres of its residence to workplaces outside the okres;

The structure of the Hungarian population's social stratification is unfavorable (the proportion of those employed in agriculture is much higher among persons of Hungarian nationality than among the Slovak or Czech population);

Modernization of the region's infrastructure is proceeding slowly and is holding back the development of the entire region.

IV. In political life:

The collective rights of the Hungarian nationality have not been recognized;

CSEMADOK [Cultural-Social Association of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia] has been excluded from the Slovak National Front;

The social composition of the members of Hungarian nationality in the representative organs is discriminatory;

The post of minister of nationality affairs within the government of the Slovak Socialist Republic has been abolished;

Institutions that guarantee the practical realization of nationality rights have not been formed within the representative organs and the organs of state power.

Starting out from the above basic shortcomings, we appeal to

Dr Gustav Husak, president of the republic,
Engr Lubomir Strougal, federal prime minister,
Alois Indra, chairman of the Federal Assembly,
Dr Gustav Husak, chairman of the Czechoslovak National Front,
Dr Gustav Husak, secretary general of the CPCZ Central Committee,
Dr Peter Colotka, chairman of the SSR government,
Viliam Salgovich, chairman of the Slovak National Council,
Mate Benyo, deputy chairman of the Slovak National Council, and chairman
of its permanent committee concerned with national committees
and nationalities,
Engr Jan Gregor, deputy chairman of the SSR government and chairman of
SSR Council on Nationalities,

Engr Dezider Krocsany, SSR minister of labor and welfare,
Jozef Lenart, chairman of the Slovak National Front,
Jozef Lenart, first secretary of the CPSL Central Committee,

as well as to all other citizens of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic that they urge, in accordance with their competence and constitutional responsibility, the investigation and legal solution of the problems ascertained above in conjunction with the equal rights of the nationalities, with special attention to the following:

A. In the area of education, pursuant to Chapter 2, Section 19, Paragraph 2, Section 24, and Section 26, Paragraph 3, of Constitutional Law No. 100/1960 Sb, and to Section 3, Paragraph 1, of Constitutional Law No 144/1968 Sb:

That complete primary education in the native language be ensured unconditionally for all youths of Hungarian nationality, beginning with the establishment of Hungarian day nurseries, through the expansion of the network of Hungarian kindergartens, up to the general-school and gymnasium level, including the expansion of the network of Hungarian secondary vocational schools and institutes for vocational training, primarily in those professions that will satisfy the demand for skilled workers in the areas occupied by the Hungarian nationality;

That specific measures be adopted to increase the number of Hungarian students enrolled in the universities and colleges of the Slovak Socialist Republic, commensurately with the nationwide proportion of the Hungarian nationality (generally by about 250 percent, but by 300 percent in the medical faculties, 400 percent in the government-and-law faculties, and about 500 percent in the colleges of economics);

That Hungarian instruction of special subjects, and an increase in the number students of Hungarian nationality (by about 300 percent) be ensured at the Agricultural College in Nitra, and the College of Veterinary Medicine in Kosice;

That special seminars, exercises, tests and examinations in Hungarian be ensured at the medical, government-and-law, and natural-science faculties of Comenius University in Bratislava and Safarik University in Kosice, at the chemical-technology, construction-engineering, mechanical-engineering, and electrical-engineering faculties of the Slovak Institute of Technology in Bratislava, and at the mechanical-engineering and electrical-engineering faculties of the Institute of Technology in Kosice;

That the Hungarian Department at the Philosophy Faculty of Comenius University be expanded into two departments, a Department of Hungarology and a Department of Hungarian Studies, and that students of this faculty who are majoring in any combination of subject be allowed to choose as electives the subjects offered by these departments;

That a Hungarian teachers' college be established in Bratislava, to train teachers for the elementary and secondary schools whose language of instruction is Hungarian;

That guarantees be given to ensure that there will be no further attempts to change to Slovak the language of instruction in Hungarian schools;

That Czechoslovak citizens of Hungarian nationality be given wider opportunity to study at universities and colleges in the Hungarian People's Republic, and to gain scientific degrees at universities, colleges and scientific institutions in that country, mostly in the social sciences and in those majors that are particularly in demand in the Hungarian-populated areas of Slovakia.

B. In the area of culture, pursuant to Chapter 2, Section 24, Paragraph 2, and Section 28 of Constitutional Law No 100/1960 Sb, and to Section 3, Paragraph 1, Items b and c, of Constitutional Law No 144/1968 Sb:

That the satisfaction of the cultural needs of Czechoslovak citizens of Hungarian nationality be not limited to the amateur movement and fiction, and that also their professional needs be met in accordance with the present level of civilization;

That a permanent Hungarian theater be established in Bratislava to ensure the further development of the Hungarian performing arts;

That professional adult-education work be developed and, to this end, the Nationality Section at the Institute of Adult Education in Bratislava be expanded, and that nationality sections (Hungarian and Ukrainian) be attached to the cultural houses in the okreses where the population is mixed;

That a Hungarian Central Library be formed, with kraj branches;

That a Cultural Center of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia be established to promote institutionally the development of the folk art, folk music, intellectual and material folk culture, and primitive art of the Hungarians living in Czechoslovakia;

That the capacities (printing and paper) for the publication of Hungarian books in all subject areas be expanded, and that in conjunction with this also the professional and editorial staffs of the Madach Book and Newspaper Publishing House be enlarged;

That there appear, in addition to a literary journal, also an independently edited Hungarian cultural and social-science journal, and a paper for the dissemination of technical and natural-science information;

That there appear also an independently edited Hungarian weekly devoted to social problems;

That the irregularly appearing okres newspapers of low linguistic and professional level be replaced by kraj newspapers appearing biweekly, specifically by two such papers in East Slovakia Kraj, and one each in Central Slovakia and West Slovakia krajs;

That Czechoslovak Television's Channel 1 in Bratislava begin transmission in the Hungarian language;

That an independent social-science institute be established to study the life and development of the Hungarian nationality in Czechoslovakia, and that this institute be staffed primarily with researchers of Hungarian nationality;

That the suitable employment be ensured of those Hungarians who completed their higher education in social-science majors, so that they will not be forced to emigrate, under the pretext of "marriage," from the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic;

That the culture of the Hungarian nationality be not suppressed under the pretext of economic effectiveness.

C. In the economy, pursuant to Chapter 1, Section 4, Paragraph 2, of Constitutional Law No 148/1968 Sb:

That the economic backwardness of the areas populated by the Hungarian nationality be liquidated;

That industrial development in these areas be in accord with the given natural and social conditions, and that primarily the food industry be developed, based on agriculture;

That manufacturing, light-industry and engineering plants be established in these areas for the manpower that will be freed in agriculture as a result of its modernization, which will end the present disguised unemployment, so as to reduce the undesirable internal emigration of labor that is characteristic of these areas and affects primarily the population of Hungarian nationality;

That industry's demand for specialists in these areas be supplied primarily from among local residents;

That the development of industry be preceded by vocational-training propaganda in conformity with the plans, and that suitable capacities be ensured in the vocational secondary schools and vocational-training institutes whose language of instruction is Hungarian;

That the harmonic development of agriculture and industry be ensured in accord with humanitarian interests, primarily

a. By ending the forced mergers of unified agricultural cooperatives and communities along the Hungarian-Slovak ethnic border;

b. By liquidating the harmful accompanying effects of large-scale industrial and agricultural production such as, for example, the chemical pollution of the natural environment along the Danube and on the East Slovakia plain;

c. By ending the intensive pollution with chemical-industry by-products on the plains and in the foothills and valleys of South Slovakia, primarily on entire Zitny Ostrov, in the valleys of the Hron, Ipol, Rima, Sajo and Bodva, and the karst plateau zone along the Laborec and Latorica, and between the Bodrog rivers;

That better use be made of the natural springs, particularly for the recreation and treatment of the local population in the Nograd, Gomor and Abauj areas;

That small industrial plants be located in the southern portions of Velky Krtis, Lucenec, Rimavska Sobota, Roznava and Kosice suburbs okreses, to hold their populations, because these hopelessly located areas are gradually becoming depopulated and extinct;

That the Hungarian population be not assimilated by force under the guise of the region's industrialization and biased urbanization;

That construction of the system of dams on the Czechoslovak sector of the Danube does not violate the economic and ethnic interests of the local population that is predominantly Hungarian.

D. In political life, pursuant to Chapter 2, Section 37, Paragraph 3, of Constitutional Law No 143/1968 Sb, to Chapter 1, Section 6, of Constitutional Law No 100/1960 Sb, and to Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Constitutional Law No. 144/1968 Sb:

That CSEMADOK be re-admitted to the Slovak National Front;

That the government of the Slovak Socialist Republic again have a minister of nationality affairs, and that the minister and deputy minister entrusted with the Bureau of Nationality Affairs be chosen from the ranks of the Hungarian and the Ukrainian minority respectively.

That nationality deputy ministers or state secretaries be appointed from among the ranks of the nationalities, in the ministries of education, culture and welfare, health, agriculture and food industry, technical development, industry, and construction industry, so that they may oversee and direct the matters pertaining to the competence of these ministries, on the territories whose population is of mixed nationality;

That the social composition of the representative organs be not improved, in the direction of lower strata, with representatives of Hungarian nationality;

That the raising of questions by the Hungarian members of representative organs, in behalf of the Hungarian nationality, must not be regarded as activity against the state;

That nationality representatives may form their own club;

That nationality representatives may consult independent experts on matters pertaining to the nationalities;

That the experts of the nationalities may form nationality councils attached to the kraj national committees of the Slovak Socialist Republic;

That nationality councils be formed and attached to the okres national committees in okreses with mixed populations, to assert the educational, cultural, labor, welfare and health interests and general equal rights of the nationalities;

That nationality sections be attached to the individual special departments of the national councils in okreses and cities with mixed populations, particularly to their educational and cultural departments, and health departments;

That the nationalities may truly be free to use their native language--orally and in writing--on the territory of the okreses with mixed populations, as well as at the kraj and central levels when addressing the organs of state power and the party organs (the Hungarian and Ukrainian languages on the territory of the Slovak Socialist Republic);

That bilingualism be obligatory for the employees of the state administrative organs, Post Office and railroad in okreses with mixed populations, at both the local and okres levels;

That the introduction of bilingualism be enhanced with language allowances;

That bilingual forms be printed;

That bilingual warning and information signs be obligatory in okreses with mixed populations;

That general tolerance and nationality tolerance prevail in the country, and that the nationality population may not fear the mere use of its native language and profession of its nationality;

That the communities of Bajany, Kopcany and Male Raskovce be annexed from Michalovce Okres to Trebisov Okres, so that administrative boundaries may not separate these three communities from the contiguous Hungarian ethnic population;

That the principle of proportionality, instead of the principle of equity that lends itself to different interpretations, be applied to political questions affecting the nationalities;

That the collective rights of the nationalities living on the territory of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic be recognized;

That the rights of Jews to collective self-assertion be recognized independently of religious freedom, to avoid the forced assimilation that threatens the country's Jewish population;

That also the Gypsy ethnic group--as a collective--enjoy nationality rights, to raise their cultural level, to end their social segregation, and to preserve their peculiar ethnic culture.

E. In legal matters, pursuant to Chapter 5, Section 75, Paragraph 2, and Chapter 6, Sections 87 and 89, and Section 93, Paragraph 3, of Constitutional Law No 148/1968 Sb:

That the shortcomings be investigated in implementing and honoring the legal principles contained in Sections 1, 3, 4 and 5 of Constitutional Law No. 144/1968 Sb.

We are submitting this memorandum pursuant to Section 29 of Constitutional Law No 100/1960 Sb.

May 1979.

1014

CSO: 2500

STATE SECURITY CHIEF URGES GREATER VIGILANCE

East Berlin DER KAEMPFER in German Vol 23 No 10, Oct 79 pp 1-2

/Editorial by Col Gen Erich Mielke, SED Central Committee Politburo member, minister for state security, on the occasion of the GDR's 30th anniversary: "Thirty Years GDR--Power of the People for the People"7

/Text7 The GDR will be 30 years old on 7 October 1979. Historically speaking, 3 decades are a short time. But what far-reaching, revolutionary changes have taken place in our country since the workers and peasants established their power and the people took their fate in their own hands! Led by the party of the working class, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, the workers created a strong socialist country through diligent and creative work. Where imperialism and reaction once ruled, the workers and farmers now govern and are putting into practice the revolutionary ideas of Marx, Engels and Lenin; the ideals of humanity are triumphing.

The GDR in its 30th year--convincing confirmation of the validity and victory of Marxism-Leninism--proof of the power and strength of the socialist order of society.

The GDR in its 30th year--a country of peace recognized worldwide, a tireless proponent of socialism's humanistic goals of peace. Our country has attained high regard in the world through its active solidarity with all the forces which struggle for social progress and national liberation.

The GDR in its 30th year--a country without exploitation and oppression, a country of social security and safety, of full employment and of people's welfare, a country in which one can live well.

It has become even more immediately clear to each individual, especially since the Eighth SED Congress, that our socialist country represents the closest interests of the working class and all laborers. That is why our citizens are actively engaged on behalf of the continual strengthening and staunch protection of the power of the workers and peasants.

That has always been a matter of honor for the combatants in our workers' battalions. In the mass movement to prepare for the important anniversary

of our republic, workers, cooperative farmers, intellectuals, craftsmen, tradesmen, young people and members of the armed forces have undertaken demanding obligations, and they are producing outstanding results. Here again the militiamen, junior officers and commanders of the worker's class militias are leading the way in an exemplary manner. With ideal achievements in production at their jobs and with the attainment of the demanding goals of the training programs they attest to the fact that they are completely aware of their responsibility as members of the producing class which wields the power in our socialist country. In all the years of the more than 25-year existence of the worker's class militia, the militiamen, junior officers and commanders have always set high goals for themselves in the socialist competition and have reached them. Led directly by the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, they continually raised their combat readiness and their value in combat from one training year to the next. In honor of the 30th anniversary of the GDR they did their best to demonstrate exceptionally high results in military training. That is impressively reflected in the tasks and goals contained in the appeal of the "Franz Stenzer" Workers' Militia Battalion, Eisenach, to all militia units to participate in the socialist competition under the cry: "Combat Orders GDR 30---always vigilant and ready for battle, we guard and strengthen our socialist fatherland."

Never before has a challenge to race found a wider echo. What has been achieved until now permits the valid conclusion that the 1979 training year will end with the best results ever. That corresponds with the way the workers celebrate anniversaries. Our party greatly values the many activities and the continual preparedness of the comrades in the militia, the junior officers and the commanders. Everyone who aids in the defense of our country deserves high recognition from society.

Without the Strong Power of the Workers and Farmers No Successful Socialist Revolution

Thirty years of the GDR are convincing proof of the validity of the Marxist-Leninist theory of revolution, of the general applicability of Lenin's theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of the experiences of the Soviet Union. Without the establishment of the political power of the workers class, the transition from the stage of antifascist-democratic upheaval to socialist revolution could not have been accomplished on our country's soil. It is the historic honor of the SED to have taken the initiative for establishing the first German workers' and peasants' power. With the creation of the GDR a turn was made in the history of our people and Europe.

From the first day of its existence, the GDR, created in the fire of the class struggle between socialism and imperialism, was subject to attacks from its domestic and foreign enemies. In view of the aggressiveness, the antisocialist and peace endangering plans and intentions of imperialism, its dangerous provocations and attempts to interfere, this struggle molded and continues to mold its development each day. The successful realization of the socialist

revolution made and still makes especially high demands on the socialist power of the state because of the specific situation of the GDR on the border between socialism and capitalism. Our party has therefore always given appropriate attention to the question of power, the basic question of every revolution. Power was, is and remains for us the most important thing. It is only when the workers' class holds the power firmly in its hands that it can fulfill its historic mission of establishing the socialist, the communist society, as General Secretary of the GDR Comrade Erich Honecker clearly and unmistakably stressed at the IX Party Congress.

Together with the other armed organs of the GDR, the militias are making an important contribution to the protection of the power of the workers and farmers and to the revolutionary accomplishments which have been achieved in 30 years. The party and the working people can always and under all conditions depend on the workers' battalions. Led by the party, they are honorably fulfilling the mission of their class. When our republic has been put to the test--as on 13 August 1961--they stood at decisive stages of combat. The revolutionary alertness of the comrades in the militia helps to frustrate the subversive machinations of the enemy and to deny him effective attacks. This finds a high degree of recognition among the workers and the armed organs in the GDR who desire always to be dependable combat comrades-in-arms of the members of the militia groups of the workers' class.

Our militias are honorably continuing the glorious traditions of the armed struggle of the German workers' class, among them the proletarian bodies of 100 persons (Hundertschaften). At that time, arms in the hands of the working class were already a thorn in the eyes of the bourgeoisie as they are for the imperialists today. Therefore, their campaign against our militias is only too understandable. However, it only strengthens the comrades-in-arms more in their unswerving loyalty to their socialist state, in their conscious and selfless efforts for the sure protection of socialist accomplishments. With the creation of the militias, our party has rendered a creative service to the use and further development of the Marxist-Leninist theory of the arming of the people and of the experiences of the armed revolutionary struggle of the proletariat. As long as the working class holds weapons firmly in its hands, the socialist order of society is under unassailable protection. All former and present enemies did not and will not succeed in their attempts to drive a wedge between the party and the working class and their armed combatants.

Unswervingly at the Side of the Soviet Union

There is a significant connection between October 1949 and October 1917. What the Russian workers and farmers began with revolutionary pioneer spirit as the first in the world more than 60 years ago also became reality on German soil with the founding of the GDR. With its historic act of liberation from fascism, the Soviet Union created the decisive precondition for the birth and growth of the first socialist German state. In the splendid film production "The Decisive Front" we are all made aware once again of the immense significance of the victory, under the leadership of Lenin's party, of the Soviet

people and its army over fascism--the worst scourge of humanity. This victory was the eloquent expression of the strength and superiority of socialism over capitalism which was condemned to fail historically.

The Soviet Union protected the young power of the workers and farmers from the aggressive and counterrevolutionary machinations of imperialism, assisted unselfishly in the construction of the new order, and today too stands loyally at our side at all times. Thirty years of the GDR--that is consequently also 30 years of unbreakable friendship and always closer cooperation with the party and the country of Lenin and the great Soviet people.

At their meeting at the Kremlin, the leading representatives of our countries, Comrades Leonid Ilich Brezhnev and Erich Honecker, were again able to determine with satisfaction that the close alliance between the Soviet Union and the GDR and between all fraternal countries had produced great accomplishments, is developing well and having a favorable affect on the entire international situation. In the past three decades we have found it confirmed again and again that only in a close alliance with the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community is a certain and stable march forward on the path of the socialist revolution possible. We will build up the fraternal bond between the GDR and the USSR more and more and do everything to reinforce the unity and solidarity of the socialist community of nations. The members of the militias have a clear, class-based relationship with the Soviet Union and with proletarian internationalism. In many units the cultivation of cooperation with the "regiment next door" has for a long time been one of the good traditions.

All Power for the Realization of the Resolutions of the 10th Party Congress

In the past three decades we have accomplished great things in all areas. We successfully formed the advanced socialist society. We can be justifiably proud of the results which were achieved. But much still remains to be done. Life always sets new tasks before us which must be mastered as we march ahead. As is well known, the systematic attainment of increased intensification of the economy and an increase in the strength of the people's economy has become a main theme in the further formation of the developed socialist society. Thus, the "Common Directive" regarding the implementation of the 1980 people's economic plan is oriented toward carrying on the struggle for fulfillment on all sides and the targeted overattainment of the planned goals for 1979 by means of new and great labor exploits in the socialist competition and also toward the basic preparation of the people's economic plan for 1980. If we wish to assure and gradually improve upon the high material and cultural level which has been attained, the most intense efforts will be demanded from every individual citizen at every place of work in our country. The new initiatives of the workers before the 30th anniversary of the GDR are proof of their firm confidence in our socialist order and their secure perspective. They demonstrate that the policy of the party is understood and energetically implemented.

The members of the militias belong once again to the pacesetters of these initiatives in their factories and installations. They know what great domestic and foreign political significance results from a strong material technical basis and from a people's economy capable of production which is developing dynamically and with stability. The comrades in the militias join in standing at the top in the struggle for exemplary accomplishments, for exceptional order, for security and discipline on the job. Conscious of their responsibility, they are actively contributing in their factories and installations so that the proven slogan "Fulfill the Plan with Security!" is increasingly more effectively realized. To combine the fulfillment of the high-pitched plans and competition goals still more closely with measures for strengthening socialist lawfulness, to guarantee an exemplary order, to combine security with discipline, is a task which applies to everyone. Everywhere one should proceed on the premise that with the further realization of the resolutions of the 10th Party Congress the safeguarding of our people's wealth, in particular the disturbance free operation of the modern and high volume factories, has increasing significance. Revolutionary watchfulness and a high sense of responsibility for the protection of the results of the labors of our people--that must determine the actions of all citizens.

Alert and Ready To Fight To Protect Socialism and Peace

It is only thanks to the growing power and strength of socialism, above all of the Soviet Union, that 30 years of the GDR coincide with an almost 35-year period of peace in Europe. As is known, this peace did not come from itself; rather it had to be fought for against the bitter resistance of its enemies. It was the balance of power which was altered in favor of socialism which forced imperialism to recognize the principles of peaceful coexistence of countries with differing social structures. Our country also made its contribution alongside the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. The measures taken toward normalizing relations between the GDR and FRG and West Berlin have had a positive affect on security in Europe.

But we are also not overlooking the fact that influential forces of imperialism and reaction are attempting to stop the process of detente and to evoke renewed confrontations and intensify the situation. NATO is undertaking great efforts to realize its long-range program and to heat up the weapons race. Those who are calling today for the production and stationing of weapons of mass destruction in Western Europe under the pretense of the apparent threat in the East, those who are massing more and more devastating weapons, are the ones who are conjuring up new serious dangers to peace.

The increasing influence of right wing reactionary forces in some imperialist countries such as the growing intrigues of the neo-Nazis, above all in the FRG, also merits our careful attention. Imperialist circles are continually attempting to strengthen the subversive attacks, especially the ideological diversion, against socialism. We also know that in the process, individual citizens again and again fall into the enemy's trap and allow themselves to be

exploited by him. For all these reasons every illusion concerning the aggressive and subversive intentions of imperialism and concerning the dangers to socialism which result from it are misplaced. Our enemies can be certain that we will always keep our powder dry and will always remain alert. In the future, the GDR will also maintain its defensive forces at the required level and prove equal to its great responsibility in the center of the field of tension on which the decision concerning war or peace for Europe will be made. "The members of our armed forces must meet all provocations of the class enemy at all times and reliably protect our socialist home. Nothing in this assignment will change in the future. Its fulfillment is the contribution of the National People's Army and all armed organs to our great work of socialism, of peace and of detente." Thus Comrade Erich Honecker explained it in his address to air force and air defense units.

In fulfillment of this task of all armed organs, the members of the militias of the workers' class should steel themselves politically and ideologically; reach a high military mastery of combat techniques and tactics; and perfect the combat strength and battle preparedness of their units. That is their contribution to the strengthening and protection of the socialist fatherland on the threshold of the fourth decade of workers' and farmers' power on German soil, and to the further strengthening of socialism in the world.

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SCHOLAR DEFENDS SUPPORT OF THIRD WORLD, DENIES SOVIET 'THREAT'

East Berlin IPW-BERICHTE in German Vol 8 No 10, Oct 79 pp 1-9, 15

[Article by Prof Dr Max Schmidt, director, GDR Institute for International Politics and Economics (IPW): "Socialism and Peace in the Worldwide Ideological Struggle: Socialism's Strength--Foundation for Securing Peace; Sharp Ideological Confrontation Over War and Peace; Thesis of Threat--A Dangerous Deliberate Lie of Imperialism." A translation of the East Berlin HORIZONT article by Prof Dr Stefan Doernberg, cited in footnote 9 below, is published under the heading, "Military Role in World Politics Analyzed," in JPRS 74350, 11 Oct 79, No 1724 of this series, pp 1-6. A translation of a lecture by Professor Schmidt, broadcast earlier in East Berlin, is published under the heading, "Coexistence, Detente Cannot Abolish Class Struggle," in JPRS 70087, 3 Nov 77, No 1468 of this series, pp 16-18. Also available is an article by Wolfram Neubert, a member of IPW's editorial board, translated under the heading, "Ideological Struggle Viewed Essential for Peaceful Coexistence," in JPRS 66851 of this series, 25 Feb 76, pp 11-34]

[Text] For centuries humanity has lived with the idea of peace. Not until the existence of a socialist state, however, as it turns out, are the nations in the position to abolish the conditions that give rise to war and to create the social circumstances that produce and insure permanent peace. The new socialist social system posed the question of war and peace in an entirely new way. It made the striving for peace and the struggle for safeguarding it permanently one of the state's and its citizens' main goals. Thereby socialism absorbed the noblest goals and most humane ideas of all of human development and laid a realistic social foundation for them.

The more than 60-year development of socialism attests to this: a social system that has overcome the antagonisms resulting from the capitalist ownership in the means of production by abolishing those property relations is the surest guarantee for peace. In contrast, all of human history has revealed that wars are the inevitable consequence of the private ownership in the means of production. Monopoly capitalist property with its inherent search for incessantly growing profits and the implacable competition resulting therefrom produces a steady drive for expansion and aggression. As early as in their "Communist Manifesto," Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels wrote: "In

proportion as the exploitation of one individual by another is put an end to, the exploitation of one nation by another will also be put an end to."¹ In his inaugural address to the International Workers Association, Marx explained that "the emancipation of the workers class requires the cooperation of several nations," which could not be obtained "by a foreign policy pursuing malicious ends, toying with national prejudices, and wasting the people's blood and stock by piratical wars."² Rather, it was important that "in opposition to the old society with its economic misery and political madness, a new society arises with peace as its international principle because every nation is ruled by the same principle--by labor."³ Lenin put it very bluntly: "This is clear: subduing war means defeating capital."⁴

The picture of a society freed from wars forever, as painted by Marxism-Leninism, is not one of wishful thinking in general. V. I. Lenin's historic distinction in this regard lies in having developed a cohesive doctrine on war, peace and revolution. In extending the views of Marx and Engels about the nature of war and peace, he examined the connection between economics, politics and war under the conditions of imperialism and in the era of transition toward socialism. His theory on the proletarian revolution and the construction of socialism points the way to a practical solution in overcoming the old society by revolution and for a new social order that means peace. Even in the initial stage of the workers movement, Marx wrote, predictively, that the time would come when the workers class would "enter the arena of history no longer as servile retinue but as an independent force, aware of its own responsibility and able to command peace while those who want to be its overlords are clamoring for war."⁵

In proportion as the forces of the revolutionary workers movement are growing, the real possibilities for implementing permanent peace increase. And through the victory of the proletarian revolution in the countries of real socialism, peace for the first time in history received a socioeconomic premise and, with it, a political home. "The most stable pillar carrying world peace is the strength of the socialist community because the strength and power of socialism serve the peace in the world," as was stated by SED Central Committee General Secretary and GDR State Council Chairman Erich Honecker.⁶

The revolutionary renewal of all vital forms of society by socialism and its growing strength exercise an ever growing peace-promoting effect in the world. The socialist community of states headed by the Soviet Union is a source of new strength for mankind enabling humanity effectively to meet the forces of war and, with the increasing efforts made by the broadest people's masses, to guarantee permanent peace and mutually advantageous collaboration. Especially the Vienna meeting between CPSU General Secretary and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet L. I. Brezhnev and U.S. President J. Carter and the signed SALT II Treaty are a final result of great importance in recent days of those enormous efforts in advancing detente and containing the arms race undertaken by the Soviet Union and the other countries in the socialist community, based on the changes in the international power balance. The quantitative and, in some matters, qualitative limits put on strategic offensive

weapons can reduce the danger of nuclear war and--with all due caution--form a certain barrier against an escalation of the arms race and make possible some further steps in that direction.

Historic Truths

The October Revolution and the rise of the first socialist state put an end to the absolute power of capitalism in the world. That also broke the imperialist monopoly control over international relations. The young Soviet power developed a foreign policy which from the outset was aimed at implementing the Leninist idea of peaceful coexistence and thereby posed against imperialist foreign policy a clear alternative.

The 1917 peace decree was an irrefutable proof that socialism in theory and practice has the answer for the task posed by historic reality which is in the interest of all nations and of the future of humanity: Socialist and capitalist states must and can peacefully coexist throughout the entire period of the revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism in the world. And in the conclusion of his speech on peace Lenin emphasized that this was not just a matter of relations without war between socialist and capitalist states but rather one of establishing state relations marked to the widest possible extent by a peaceful juxtaposition, by mutual agreement and collaboration. It was clear from the outset that this struggle for enforcing the democratic principles in peaceful state relations, for abolishing the threat and use of force in international affairs, and for implementing the principles of peaceful coexistence would be a lengthy and complicated process. It amounts to repressing imperialist influence on the substance and developmental thrust of international affairs.

An analysis of this process clearly shows: The struggle for the implementation of the Leninist peaceful coexistence policy shows a close dialectical interaction with the development of the revolutionary world process and its main force, socialism, and with the development of the general crisis of capitalism. It becomes clearly visible that the objective connection between socialism and peace prevails in foreign policy in proportion as socialism consolidates and becomes stronger, turns back the effect of inevitability in capitalism and, through implacable confrontation with the forces of the exploiter system, itself gains increasing influence on world developments.

Soviet coexistence policy in its first phase was aimed above all at securing a democratic peace, establishing normal and equal diplomatic and economic relations, outlawing aggression, disarmament, a collective security system in Europe, and the taming of the fascist aggressors. Due to the international power balance at the time, these goals could only partly be realized, and World War II could not be prevented.

In the outcome of the annihilation of the fascist aggressors, the revolutionary world process assumed new dimensions. The national and social liberation movement got a powerful boost. People's democratic revolutions in Europe and Asia gave rise to new socialist states that broke out of the capitalist system. The socialist world system began to form.

These qualitative changes in the world power balance opened new possibilities for preventing world war and pacifying international relations. The consolidation and strengthening of socialism made the crucial difference in lending binding international law authority to the peaceful coexistence principles in fundamental postwar documents like the Potsdam Agreement and the UN Charter. The USSR and the young people's democratic states staunchly advocated the use of these favorable conditions for creating a stable peace system in Europe and the world. They made many peace, detente and disarmament proposals.

If the imperialist states had observed the postwar agreements, it would have amounted to an implementation of all essential peaceful coexistence principles. The imperialist powers, however, departed from their collaboration with the USSR. Their ruling circles openly adopted a policy directed at the forceful liquidation of socialism. In his notorious Fulton speech, Churchill virtually called for a third world war as early as 1946. The theories about the "Iron Curtain," "Containment," the "Policy of Strength," and "Roll back" begin to determine imperialist policy. They threatened with words: "The United States has the power considerably to enlarge the burdens under which Soviet policy must operate and thereby promote tendencies ultimately leading to the collapse or to the gradual weakening of Soviet power."⁷

And the United States openly threatened with the atomic bomb. The aggressive NATO alliance was put together. In Asia, the wars against Korea and the peoples of Indochina were unleashed. The imperialist powers broke the Potsdam Agreement. Nor did they abide by the principles of the UN Charter, and they pushed aside all USSR proposals on safeguarding peace, arms limitation, and the collective security system. In the mid-1950's the main imperialist forces with their policy threatened the peace in Europe and in the whole world. Cold and hot war fused.

Nonetheless, the cold war did not fulfill its blackmailing function. Nor could the most aggressive imperialist circles convert it into a hot world war. In particular the growing strength of the USSR and of the other, newly established socialist countries, their rigorously peace-oriented foreign policy, prevented the implementation of the undisguised aggressive intentions of the most reactionary imperialist circles. This was the time when the imperialist positions of "no-appeasement," "containment," and the implementation of the "roll back" strategy were undermined. The foreign and security policy of the USSR, based on its economic, political and military strength, together with that of the other countries in the socialist world system in formation, thus crucially contributed to creating favorable external conditions for peaceful socialist construction. All adventurous designs by world imperialism in exporting the counterrevolution and meddling with the sovereign affairs of the socialist states were frustrated, and the socialist community was reliably protected from any aggression.

A qualitative change in the international power balance manifests itself here, demonstrated by the following facts briefly to be accounted for:

The Soviet Union's economic, political and military strength increased. Socialist production relations triumphed in the countries which, in the outcome of World War II, had overthrown the exploiter system, and they began to shape the developed socialist society. The U.S. nuclear weapon's monopoly was broken, and that weapon was made unsuitable as a blackmail tool. With the triumph of socialism in Cuba, the new social order was firmly implanted on the American continent. The launching of the first artificial earth satellite demonstrated socialism's superiority in crucial economic, scientific-technical, political and military fields; thereby the United States came into the immediate range of socialist military power. The CEMA region became the most dynamic economic region in the world. Within the Warsaw Pact framework, the socialist states boosted their military strength and through their consistent peace policy and unified actions increased their foreign policy authority. In Europe, aggressive imperialist designs were definitively blocked by the protection of the GDR national border on 13 August 1961, and peace was made secure.

Socialism Today--The Guarantee for Permanent Peace

These changes indicated that the influence of imperialism in international relations could be pushed back more and more, that the time of its domination had passed, and that socialism was becoming the decisive element in international affairs.

For the cause of peace this mainly meant: Based on this new power constellation, which mainly also included, along with the growing economic, political and ideological strength of socialism, the emergence of a new role for the developing countries, the increased activities of the workers class and of all democratic and peace-loving forces in the capitalist countries, as well as a new quality accruing to the world peace movement, the time had become ripe for the transition from Cold War to detente and for enforcing the peaceful coexistence principles as the norm for international relations, against the resistance from imperialist enemies. The last 10 years also were years of tenacious struggle for attaining that goal as well as qualitatively new successes in the implementation of the idea and policy of peaceful coexistence between states with differing social orders.

The changes socialism has caused in the direction toward world peace are incalculable. A good 60 years ago, the genocidal imperialist world war devastated large parts of Europe in particular. Forty years ago, German imperialism unleashed the second world war in which 60 million people were killed. Today, however, the ruling circles of the imperialist powers are compelled to accept the Leninist principle of the peaceful coexistence between states with differing social systems. Despite their persistent and multifaceted resistance, despite the counter-attack from aggressive imperialist NATO circles, the process of detente was not reversed. It remains the basic tendency of our time. Decisive for that is--as the 10th SED Central Committee session has observed--that what counts in the international arena is the increased strength of socialism and of the other main revolutionary currents. The rigor and consistency of the countries in the socialist

community and their foreign policy course of principle play an outstanding role in preventing another war, reinforcing international security and further extending the detente process.⁸

Especially for the nations of Europe, for centuries a major battleground for devastating wars, hopeful prospects have opened up through turning from Cold War to the beginnings of detente:

Through its active peace policy, socialism succeeded in stabilizing the longest peace period in this century and to take it into its fourth decade. Already generations in the population on our continent no longer know the horrors of war from their own personal experience.

The danger of thermonuclear world war was turned back. And in all still existing effective hotbeds of danger, the public international demand for ending the arms race and for outlawing nuclear weapons assumes more and more real material force.

The international relations between states with differing social systems are normalizing. No longer can one ignore the renunciation of force in solving interstate controversies, on which the socialist states have persistently insisted. In spite of all the risky imperialist threats--with neutron weapons, MX, the new "Eurostrategic" nuclear weapons and other new steps in the imperialist arms race--military pressure in Europe turns out more and more to be a discredited device.

The states have started a broad, mutually advantageous and objective collaboration in the economic, scientific and cultural fields. Economic relations between capitalist and socialist countries secure employment for many thousand enterprises in the "West" and guarantee millions of jobs. Cultural exchange is assuming new dimensions.

The treaties and accords the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have concluded in recent years with major imperialist countries, not last the Final Act of Helsinki, lay a solid foundation for consolidating peace in Europe. For the first time the principles of peaceful coexistence were recognized by all participating states as the essential foundation for their relations. None of the many designs by imperialist forces wanting to undermine or directly negate these efforts were able to reverse that.

A Pause in the Ideological Struggle

This turn from Cold War to international detente is not only a turning point in interstate relations but also a pause in the ideological confrontation between socialism and imperialism in the matter of peace. A pause it is because now for the first time the policy of peaceful coexistence, a Marxist-Leninist ideal, is prevailing worldwide as a norm for international relations. And also, because this fact is visible evidence that socialist ideology does change the world by conforming, like no other, to humanity's elemental interests in living in peace. Especially in this regard socialism proves

itself the humanism of our era because it defends and enforces the fundamental human right, the right to live in peace, with all its resources in material and ideas. The humanity of the social order in the socialist countries already has effects that are worldwide, far transcending national borders.

That also explains why intensified ideological struggle has broken out over the implementation of the policy of peace and detente with the proponents of the Cold War and anticommunists of all shades. This struggle is so very intense because it has always been part of the imperialist doctrine to solve political issues by military means. Just since the end of World War II, imperialism has more than 100 armed aggressions on its account. However deeply it conflicts with the inevitabilities of our times and with the nations' political and economic interests, counting on the military factor and using military force survives as the basic conception of imperialist states and politicians. That is unequivocally attested to by Washington's NATO long-range program. NATO strategy is based on using as pressure military resources for implementing imperialist political goals. By abusing the data of the scientific-technical revolution for military-aggressive purposes, in developing and introducing new generations and types of mass destruction weapons with unimaginable destructive power, they mean to turn back the wheel of history, that is, revise once more the international power balance in favor of imperialism. Imperialism sees in the arms race a factor for doing economic harm to the socialist countries, for perfecting its military violence as a means for internal "disciplining" in its own countries, and for maintaining and enforcing, directly and indirectly, imperialist interests in the developing countries. Growing importance is being attributed to the military factor.⁹ That is attested to once again by the plans for the "medium-range missile power" in Western Europe and for directly extending the NATO operations area into the developing countries, as presented at the NATO symposium held in Brussels from 1 to 3 September.¹⁰

Continued detente and the end of the arms race and disarmament, as desired by the socialist countries, thus deeply affect the nature of imperialism. Limiting and stopping the arms race therefore becomes the "question of all questions in contemporary international affairs." One's attitude toward disarmament measures the truth content of all intentions uttered about detente. All those forces that are pleading for them to the outside while they are actually pursuing aggressive and counterrevolutionary aims thus are conducting intense ideological warfare against the constructive disarmament policy of the Soviet Union and the other members of the socialist community of states.

They are seeking to distort the true interconnections in the struggle for disarmament and its importance for a peaceful future for mankind. By demagoguery they seek to detach, on the one side, peace from socialism in spite of the objective unity between them and, on the other side, imperialism from war. Various theories and lies must do their bidding there. Among the claims they have raised is that military armament gives impetus to scientific-technical progress, arms production stimulates the economy and assures jobs, and arming is necessary to preserve peace through a balance of terror.

The Consistency and the Modifications in the Lie About the Threat

In the center of that "theory" there stands the lie that the USSR is allegedly "threatening" the West. Right now that lie is the main ideological weapon imperialist forces, mainly NATO, are using to defame the socialist peace policy and intensify international tension.

What do they mean to achieve by it? The aggressive imperialist circles are intent on blocking the political-ideological power of persuasion the socialist peace policy has and discriminating against its authority among the nations in the nonsocialist world. At the same time they are seeking to detract from the deep social crisis of the capitalist system and to manipulate their own population in an anticommunist direction against the bugbear of an "external enemy." Thereby they mean to motivate the imperialist arms race, total militarization and the social hardships that come with it. And finally they are seeking to justify their anti-decente policy before their own audience and denigrate the socialist armed forces and their class mission.

The lie about the threat from the east is neither original nor new. It saw the light of the world as long as more than 60 years ago when the new socialist society was just about to assume real contours on but one-sixth of the earth. By the same kind of inflammatory pursuit 14 imperialist powers sought to justify their armed intervention against the young Soviet power from 1919 to 1922. The same lie was handy when Hitler Germany unleashed World War II 40 years ago. And again with the same infamous conceit the Cold War against socialism was ignited in the late 1940's and early 1950's.

Today they are again trying to get all they can out of this ideological device to "justify" their incessant mobilization and the development of increasingly more perilous weapons systems. The very fact that the creative peace mission of socialism has become more and more evident to humanity within the last decade and has made it more and more attractive as a truly humane social order gives no breathing spell to the militaristic forces of imperialism. One response they made to the policy of detente and peaceful coexistence was their most eager continuation of material war preparations, which can only make the international situation more intense. The U.S. President, for example--contravening the spirit of SALT II--, ordered the construction of the mobile intercontinental MX missile. Very soon the laser weapon is scheduled to go into production in U.S. armaments enterprises. Development projects in ethnic, geophysical and ozon weapons is in full swing. The U.S. Government and leading FRG politicians are jointly pushing for a new weapons system in Western Europe, the nuclear medium-range missile of the Pershing II type and the so-called cruise missiles.

These acts underscore, if unintentionally, who it is from whom the threat against humanity is actually coming. The anticommunist lie about the "threat" is a reaction to the fact that the USSR is the strongest adversary to imperialist aggressiveness, that the Soviet Union embodies the principal peace force in the world. Precisely by the consistent peace policy and initiative of the

USSR, favoring an end to the arms race and disarmament, the most reactionary forces feel "threatened," which they then turn into a "threat to the West" by some Soviet aggression.

The thesis of a military threat from the Soviet Union is given the lie by the social order of socialism. Social ownership in the means of production, conducted in the spirit of genuine socialist internationalism, obviates expansion and aggressiveness. There are no arms profiteers, no monopolies, no class, no social stratum or professional group that could be interested in war and the preparation of war because it would enrich them. That much had to be admitted now even by a bourgeois paper in the FRG, which wrote: "One thing should be considered with great seriousness and, at last, also with honesty: There is no one in the east who makes money from armaments, no stock holders, no managers, no retired officers or politicians acting as advisors. This kind of armaments lobby as we have it in the West does not exist there."¹¹ There is no big power chauvinism here that raises claims against neighboring countries. Public ownership in the means of production and the political power of the workers class, allied with the other working masses and led by a Marxist-Leninist party, produce peaceful, creative, constructive work.

With reference to Peking's aggression against socialist Vietnam, some imperialist circles have claimed it allegedly "proved" that class-mindedness was irrelevant to wars and conflicts. The facts are: The leadership of a country that once started going the socialist way but then turned onto the slope of anti-Sovietism, deformed the political power of the workers class into a military-bureaucratic dictatorship and let itself be led by an ultra-nationalistic Maoism, instead of internationalist Marxism-Leninism, removes itself from the socialist community. As experiences of recent years have taught us, they are approaching the ideas, methods and goals of imperialism. It has nothing to do with socialism.

The lie of the "threat" is also being refuted by the political program and humanistic ideal of socialist society. The workers class and the other working people allied with it always have had to bear the sufferings from armaments and war policy. They have had the bitter experience that imperialist war means worse oppression and the loss of democratic rights and freedoms. The emancipated workers, having become the ruling class in the socialist states, and their class policy as worked out by their Marxist-Leninist party and brought to realization by it, therefore embody the guarantee that a war will never emanate from real socialism. Consistent democratism and genuine libertarianism are elements here that are inherent in public life, and they of necessity determine the socialist state's peace policy. After all, the "strengthening of peace," as L. I. Brezhnev has announced, "is one of the most important guarantees for the greatest human right--the right to live. But living to us does not merely mean existence; it means humanly dignified existence."¹²

The meaning of socialism therefore lies in doing everything for the good of men, the happiness of the peoples, the interests of the workers class and of all working people. The socialist states have assigned to themselves magnificent objectives to that end. They are working on setting up modern efficient economies and are approaching the peaceful exploitation of Siberia, an entire continent, so to speak. They are already implementing exemplary social programs and are focusing on the gradual transition to communist society with its common acceptance of the principle, "From each according to his abilities--to each according to his needs."

Interrelation Between Socialism, Peace and Social Progress

A different version of the lie about the "threat" lies in the imperialist propaganda design to present as a cause for tension what actually amounts to the successes of the national liberation struggle, the progressive development of young states with a socialist bent and, altogether, any progressive social changes in the world. That includes the recently ever more widely spread slander that the USSR and its allies were engaged in "colonial expansion" and their selfless aid to the national and social liberation struggle, particularly in Africa and Southeast Asia, constituted a threat against peace and a violation of the principles of peaceful coexistence. Thus the attempt is being made to combine in an inadmissible fashion the peaceful coexistence of states with differing social systems and sociopolitical developments and to interpret detente as if it were some sort of a guarantee for the social status quo.

Marxist-Leninist thinking and conduct, on the other hand, proceed from the clear realization that any revolution is an objective process based on internal causes, social contradictions and solutions that have to be found for them. It is a process that can neither be created nor imposed from the outside, a process that will mature only in the course of the class struggle in that particular country itself. Proceeding from the inviolable right every people has to determine its own destiny, the communists therefore oppose any export of the revolution as much as any export of the counter-revolution, of course.

Anyone who would like to distort detente into some sort of guarantee for the sociopolitical status quo in the world thereby actually only reiterates the demand for recognizing exclusive interests of imperialism and its claim to dominating the entire nonsocialist part of the planet. The GDR's position on that was announced at the Ninth SED Congress in a most unequivocal manner, as follows: "Detente is using all sides. We are deeply committed to it. It can of course not lead to any deals about spheres of influence, about the sociopolitical status quo in the capitalist countries or Western ideological penetration of the socialist countries. But that precisely is what imperialism seeks to deduce from peaceful coexistence. It would like to stop progress and export the counterrevolution, which is, meddle with the internal affairs of other states."¹³

The sharpening internal contradictions in any given country, the social contradictions in any exploiter society, the contradictions among the imperialist powers stemming from their uneven development, and the contradictions that exist between the capitalist states and the developing countries, or the national liberation movements--those are the causes and determinants for the movement of social progress in those regions. Peaceful coexistence and detente cannot cancel the objectivity of the internal class struggle.

The external situation and the international situation do of course affect the internal developmental processes in the countries on the earth. They may propel them or delay them, in proportion as external conditions develop, and their effects differ in accordance with the given socioeconomic system.

The socialist states have never curtailed their active solidarity with nations fighting against imperialism and reaction. And they regard the political and social changes going on now in many areas in Africa, Asia and Latin America as inevitable world historic processes, as the historically necessary forming of peoples and nations into independent sociopolitical forces, which find their natural allies in the socialist community of states.

This is all the more so because the advances in the liberation revolution and the formation and consolidation of anti-imperialist states are weakening the imperialist positions, which are endangering the peace, and are strengthening the peace potentials of the revolutionary world movement. It is reasonable and right for the USSR and the states in the socialist community to provide them with the desired aid also in their organizing their own defense against imperialist interventions (in whatever form). It underscores the inseparable connection between socialism and peace that the conference of the secretaries of the fraternal parties in the socialist countries announced "their parties' resolve resolutely to support the struggle the peoples are conducting for freedom and independence, for their sacred right to determine their own destiny without interference from the outside, against imperialist, colonialist and neocolonialist policy, and for peace, friendship and progress for the peoples on our planet."¹⁴

Any attempts by the imperialist powers at blackmailing the USSR and its allies, in seeking to make their own participation in detente dependent on the renunciation of fraternal solidarity, on an agreement to "freezing the status quo" (that is, the restoration or eternalization of imperialist supremacy over those regions), are built on the sand of reactionary illusions. Rather, the struggle for detente and peaceful coexistence has also become crucially prerequisite to social progress because it objectively extends the possibilities for the revolutionary and democratic forces everywhere to assert their present and future interests.

Peace Must Be Defended

To satisfy man's growing material and intellectual needs we need no war, which only destroys the peoples' productive capacities. What is rather needed is preserving the state of development humanity has reached and always more rapidly boosting its productive and creative capacities.

Each ruble, each zloty, each koruna, each mark that no longer has to be spent on defense helps more rapidly still implement this human welfare program. The socialist states would love to convert their defense into peacetime production, for civilian needs, for the great benefit of all of society. That step is out of the question right now because of political realities in the world and in view of the hard experiences of history, not only by the Soviet Union but also by Vietnam, Korea and Cuba. It is simply not possible to ignore the fact that the declared thrust of the aggressive forces and of imperialist military policy continues to be against socialism.

If the GDR is compelled to spend M 8.6 billion on this year's budget for insuring its external security, its sociopolitical projects make it easy to see how much other good use it would have for those funds. Funds allocated for housing construction and child care, subsidies for stable consumer prices and for basic foods, tariffs and rentals, for public education and other matters could be significantly increased if the GDR were not compelled to face up to the aggressive intentions directed against it.

We sometimes get the suggestion from Western circles the socialist countries should "set an example" and reduce their defense potential. It would, so they say, both release funds for social and cultural purposes and be a sign of good will. Historic experiences confirm, however, that such signs of good will have never been honored by the enemies of socialism. That was the case, for instance, when Red Army strength was reduced to one-ninth of what it needed for its defense, after the aggression by 14 imperialist powers against the young Soviet power was turned back. The response the imperialist states made to that was to increase their arms.

It was similar when the USSR in the second half of the 1950's reduced its troop strength by 2 million and also cut down significantly its military expenditures. And again in December 1963, when the Soviet Union reduced its defense expenditures on its own initiative, this new sign of good will was anything but emulated. On the contrary, the United States threw itself at Vietnam in 1964 and increased its arms budget year after year. In spite of that, the USSR did not raise its defense expenditures for 8 years. Socialism has, sure enough, proven a maximum of good will.

The Soviet Union Seeks No Military Superiority

The military factor in foreign policy strategy has never been used by the socialist states for imposing their will on other states. Their military potential is always confined to protective and defense tasks. Neither from a historical nor from an up-to-date vantage point can one find a single proof that a socialist state or the community as a whole has initiated the arms race. And with respect to the development of weapons technology too, especially in the weapons of mass destruction, the Soviet Union has always only reacted to challenges from imperialism--and most cautiously so.

Never yet has any state been militarily attacked, threatened or blackmailed by the Soviet Union or the socialist states. Their military might, as their authority altogether, has always been used to add weight when it was important to prevent aggression, to end it or put a stop to imperialist theft. It was in this sense that CPSU Central Committee General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev announced: "The Soviet Union's defense potential must be large enough so that no one will dare disturb our peaceful life. Our policy aims not at superior armaments but at reducing them, dismantling military confrontation. Never will our country take the road of the aggressors or raise its sword against other nations."¹⁵

Never yet have the socialist states set the arms spiral in motion. The first atomic bombs that were dropped, in August 1945, were not Soviet, they were American. The Soviet Union had proposed to refrain from that new weapon.

Not the socialist countries were the first to unite under the Warsaw Pact; the capitalist states had already done so, for blackmail purposes, in April 1949, under NATO.

Not the Soviet Union but the United States started in the 1950's with a campaign about an alleged "bombing gap." Later, when a strategic U.S. B-52 squadron was operational, it was admitted they had resorted to a useful lie.

Not in the USSR but once again in the United States they invented a "missile gap" in the 1960's. When the United States finally had more than 1,000 ICBM's and had put into service a fleet of missile-bearing submarines, had, in other words, taken another leap in the arms race, there came the official admission of an alleged "error."

Not the socialist states but the United States it was which was the first to equip its missiles with multiple warheads, in the early 1970's.

Today, not the socialist countries, but the United States and other NATO states are threatening with building neutron weapons and deploying them in Europe. The socialist countries, on the other hand, have proposed to do without the production of this in the highest degree antihuman weapon.

Today--though there is a nearly equal balance of military forces in Europe too--not the socialist states but Western powers have invented a "superiority" on the other side. And once again they are preprogramming an "answer." On FRG territory, U.S. nuclear missiles of the Pershing 2 type with a 2,500-km range are to be deployed, and they also want to introduce and deploy cruise missiles which have a high precision and explosive capacity.

It would start a qualitatively new mobilization stage because it would station a nuclear weapon on FRG soil which could strike the Soviet territory. The FRG would become a source of increased danger for the Warsaw Pact countries. Forty years after fascist Germany's surprise attack on the Soviet Union it would also amount to a politically grave change of the situation.

That would create a situation which would so much upset the balance in the military potentials between NATO and the Warsaw Pact that has come about in the course of the postwar decades that countermeasures would become unavoidable. It means that the basis of detente itself would be undermined. This clearly would start another round in the arms race and it would, at the same time, hurl a torpedo against all ongoing and planned negotiations on military detente and arms limitation. This concerns the continuation from SALT II to SALT III which, after all, is meant to include new strategic and geographic areas. No less would the implementation of these plans be a blow against the Vienna negotiations on mutual armed forces and arms reduction in Central Europe, even before as much as one step forward could be taken there.

To mislead the public and justify their dangerous "Europe missile" plans, some Western politicians have come up with the concept of mobilization "catch-up," and bourgeois mass media have been eagerly putting it into circulation. But all the talk about the "catch-up" is nothing but a modified form of the legend of the "threat from the East."

The word "catch-up" is meant to give the illusion of an imbalance of military forces in Europe. Yet there is a near military equilibrium--as even Western politicians recognize. This equilibrium does of course not exist for each type of weapon, but it exists with respect to the entire potential. The Soviet missiles, meant to be used as an alibi for the attempt at gaining military preponderance, are a component of this equilibrium. And it simply is a fact that cannot be placed in doubt by anything that the Soviet medium-range missiles were developed not as an instrument of threat but as a defense against NATO's aggressive military weapons systems. The creation and modernization of Soviet medium-range rockets is a response to NATO's reinforcing its nuclear weapons potential in Western Europe (in the FRG alone there are 7,000 tactical nuclear weapons), to NATO's system of bases encircling the socialist states, to that fleet of nuclear weapons-carrying medium-range bombers, to the nuclear missiles in U.S. submarines which are cruising around Europe, and to the nuclear weapons potential of other NATO states.

The "catch-up" phrase is meant to give the impression as if the Soviet Union was chasing ahead in mobilizing. And everything is being done as if the arms limitation negotiations involved nothing but Soviet missiles. NATO is acquitted, in advance, from making commensurate efforts in Europe. Its new weapons systems are simply being manipulated away.

This too has received a constructive answer from the socialist states. They are not only known to be ready to sign a treaty with all states that took part in CSCE in which the participants obligate themselves not to be the first to use nuclear as well as conventional weapons against one another. Above and beyond that, for them there is no type of weapon which to limit or reduce they would be unwilling, on the basis of the strict principle of equal security for all countries. And finally, in their Moscow memorandum they have offered negotiations on limiting or reducing those components of

the military potentials in Europe that at present have caused "concern" on the other side. Yet these proposals have been "examined" and not been answered by NATO for a year--unless NATO's long-range program is accepted as some "answer."

Peace--Socialism's State Policy

More than six decades have demonstrated that the struggle for disarmament and permanent peace is the state policy of socialism. An unbroken chain ranges from the Soviet Union's disarmament proposals at the 1922 Genoa Conference to the current initiatives by the socialist community of states on halting the arms race and on disarmament, a treaty on outlawing the first use of nuclear weapons, on the non-use of force, and on the convention for mutually refraining from neutron weapons.

Thus far, however, the United States and its NATO allies have accepted but few of the Soviet proposals, and when they did, then only after many years of bitter resistance. Every agreement that has been made has shown it to have been a malicious lie to insinuate the Soviet Union was not serious about its proposals and its will for peace. And precisely that has also been the reason why, in order to maintain the lie about the "threat," crucially effective disarmament measures contained in the proposals also were rejected.

Those fabricators of the "threat" have been pilloried by their own admissions. A "NATO Letter" in May 1977 admits frankly and without any fuss: "The Soviet Union never has had the intention--and is not likely to have it today either--to conduct a nuclear aggressive war. In fact, the Soviet Union has no intention to conduct any war." If nonetheless the lie about the "threat" is given the works, time and time again, it has its reasons. An FRG study on the Bundeswehr reveals this: "If the assumption that our social system is endangered by the socialist camp is not correct, our defense policy concept becomes relegated to the realm of the absurd or, even worse, is unmasked as a means for maximizing profits by the few who rule. If we fail in proving a threat to the West by the Warsaw Pact states, our work becomes, from the outset, discreditable, in all its parts."¹⁶

The former U.S. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld confirms the intent: "It is not so much a matter of some unexpected 'discovery' by the Pentagon of an increase in Soviet strength but rather an effective method for having an influence on the American people, in constantly reiterating the same facts until they have entered their consciousness."¹⁷

The deputy supreme commander of NATO in Europe, G. Schmueckle (FRG), also points out the lie of the "threat" mainly has the job to crank up armaments, highly profitable as they are to big capital. "In alliances the military affect armaments by describing the threat. Then, when the opponent's strength is exaggerated and an excessive military response is recommended along with it, armaments can get another boost."¹⁸

And so the peace protestations by NATO and the monopolist circles supporting it turn out to be demagoguery, and ideological struggle in disguising and enforcing their true, expansionist and thus counterrevolutionary goals, aimed against socialism.

Permanent peace requires the continued, all-round strengthening and consolidation of that socioeconomic force and structure in which peace finds its economic, social and political base. That is the only way for socialism to fulfill its historic role and responsibility for safeguarding peace, for the security and cooperation of the nations, and for the good of all mankind.

FOOTNOTES

1. Marx/Engels, "Werke" (Works), Vol 4, Berlin, 1959, p 479.
2. Ibid., Vol 16, Berlin, 1962, p 13.
3. Ibid., Vol 17, Berlin, 1962, p 7.
4. V. I. Lenin, "Werke," Vol 26, Berlin, 1961, p 341.
5. Marx/Engels, "Werke," Vol 16, pp 356-357.
6. E. Honecker, "Bericht des Zentralkomitees der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands an den IX. Parteitag der SED" (SED Central Committee Report to the Ninth SED Congress), Berlin, 1976, p 28.
7. G. Kennan, quoted in W. E. Williams, "Die Tragödie der amerikanischen Diplomatie" (The Tragedy of American Diplomacy), Frankfurt/Main, 1973, p 232.
8. "Conference of the Central Committee Secretaries of the Communist and Workers Parties of Socialist Countries," NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, Berlin, 7/8 July 1979.
9. Cf. S. Doernberg, "International Detente and the Military Factor," HORIZONT, Berlin, No 36, 1979.
10. There, the former U.S. Secretary of State H. Kissinger, among other things, said it was "necessary to station new weapons in West European countries" and there was need for a "correct doctrine for the new nuclear medium-range weapons to be stationed in Western Europe" (FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 3 September 1979). NATO Supreme Commander and U.S. General Haig called for improved coordination among the United States, Great Britain and France for possibly "intervening in the OPEC states of the Middle East or in southern Africa on account of the minerals," for which NATO was "almost completely dependent on the collusion between Washington and Bonn" (FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, 3 September 1979).

11. FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, 13 August 1979.
12. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 31 May 1979.
13. O. Fischer, "Discussion Speech at the Ninth SED Congress," "Protokoll der Verhandlungen des IX. Parteitages der SED" (Ninth SED Congress Proceedings), Vol I, Berlin, 1976, p 264.
14. "Conference of the Central Committee Secretaries . . .," loc. cit.
15. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 19 January 1977.
16. Portner/Schulz, "Sein oder nicht-sein" (To Be Or Not To Be), Regensburg, 1972.
17. Quoted from HORIZONT, Berlin, No 10, 1977.
18. STERN, Hamburg, 8 December 1977.

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CSO: 2300

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

TERMINATION OF FRG PAYMENTS FOR GDR PRISONERS RUMORED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 1 Nov 79 p 10

[Article by Peter Jochen Winters, datelined Berlin, 31 Oct: "More Discretion in Ransom of Prisoners--How Political Prisoners in the GDR Can Be Helped Most Effectively"]

[Text] At the end of September the State Council of the GDR passed an amnesty resolution on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of its founding. The release of prisoners began on 10 October. By 14 December the releases should be completed. On 9 October, the last load of prisoners arrived in the FRG; their release from GDR prisons was effected by "special measures of combined German character" on the part of the Federal government. Reading between the lines: they were bought free by the Federal government. For a few days now there have been rumors, which are being "taken very seriously" by the Federal government, that the GDR wants to discontinue the release of prisoners in return for "compensation payments." The reasons for this, according to the rumors, is that this form of trade in human beings damages the reputation of the GDR--which has just become a member of the Security Council of the United Nations.

East Berlin Is Silent

Whether these rumors are true or not, whether they were spread by the GDR to test the reaction of the Federal government or to introduce a new twist into the game for the transaction of the "business" is something we do not know. The officials are silent. The timing of these rumors with the amnesty in the GDR, however, is striking. This amnesty is compared to the last amnesty in the GDR in 1972. Over 25,000 prisoners were released then from jail, over 2,000 of whom were shipped to the West immediately; as it was then called, without financial support from the Federal government. According to official sources in East Berlin, 20,000 to 25,000 prisoners are involved in this amnesty. But it is notable that up to now no "GDR citizen" who was given amnesty has yet been shipped to the West. All in all only two have come over up to now: Bahro and Huebner--and they were first released into the GDR. Therefore a serious difference to the amnesty of 1972 becomes apparent already: obviously those given amnesty are no

longer shipped immediately to the West, but rather are released in the GDR. After their release, they can apply for resettlement in the West. Yet whether and--if so--when such applications are approved, remains open.

Supposedly, the GDR, with this practice which deviates from that of 1972, wants to counter the spreading opinion in the GDR that if one wants to come to the West, one only has to do some sort of "criminal deed" which will not be punished too severely--for instance, being caught while preparing to flee--and sit in prison for a short while in order ultimately to be shipped to the West. The rumors that the GDR wants to stop the possibility of ransoming prisoners are in keeping with these efforts of trying to clog up the "flight path." Many people who want to flee and who become subject to punishment in the GDR are speculating upon being bought free in the near future. Obviously such speculations are to be terminated.

Since the beginning of the ransom payments for prisoners, the GDR has valued strictest discretion in this "business." In the West this was respected at first. Over the course of a few years, however, these customs have changed. This obviously makes it more difficult for the GDR to maintain the ransom practice any longer. The possibility should not be excluded that the Socialist Unity Party of Germany at first wanted to pull the press emergency brake, so to speak, by using its Department for Agitation and Propaganda without actually intending to stop ransom payments.

A statement by East Berlin Attorney Vogel, who has been involved in the transactions with prisoners since 1963 as the legal representative of the GDR, also indicates this. In an interview with the West Berlin newspaper DER ABEND, Vogel said: "in this respect I see very black clouds on the horizon since it has become fashionable to reduce true help to material for the market in scandals and gossip. Even film-makers are at work and planning in a James Bond style. Whoever destroys would like to have an hour of consultation with me in the future." But he also said: "With care and quietly, a solution has been found for each problem up to now. That applies here and today."

At First a Breather

It cannot be assumed--and in the interests of the persons involved is not something to be wished--that the GDR is indeed thinking about ending the possibility of buying the freedom of prisoners. If it did that, it would not only have to make do without the valuable foreign currency it brings but also would have to keep a growing number of "troublemakers" under control, which up to now it could avoid "elegantly." Insofar, the GDR should have an interest in continuing the action. But for the time being, it appears to be wanting a breather in order to get the matter out of the public limelight and thereafter to want to practice new forms of release. Despite some moral thoughts, we have to have an interest in being able to ransom prisoners in the future as well--if the persons involved cannot be

helped effectively by any other means. For that reason, the GDR's efforts to handle the matter discretely again should be taken seriously and should not be counteracted.

Since the wall was built, every Federal administration has made an effort to obtain the release to the West for political prisoners in the GDR. For around 1 billion marks, up to now about 16,400 persons have been bought free. Last year about 84 million marks were paid for these releases. For 1979, 91 million marks are available, of which more than a half has already been paid for the 700 prisoners released so far. For the coming year, 100 million marks are supposed to be made available. Up to now a separate prize was agreed upon for each prisoner. The GDR viewed this as "compensation" by setting the price in accordance with the degree of occupational specialization and the costs required to train the person involved, yet the "severity" of the prisoner's crime was also taken into account. Years ago, considerations were already made as to whether this "business" should be depersonalized, that is whether Bonn should just pay a flat yearly sum to the GDR for which the GDR would then release a certain number of prisoners to the west. In this way, they wanted to avoid the criticism of "human trade," of haggling over each individual.

This type of flat payment, that is payments from one side and releases of political prisoners by the other side on a nonspecific case basis, could also now be the solution.

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DEMOCRATIC CRITICISM MORE CONSTRUCTIVE THAN LIBERAL CRITICISM

Budapest KRITIKA in Hungarian No 10, Oct 79 p 5

[Article by Laszlo Tuto: "Democratism, Criticism, and the Individual"]

[Text] In recent years we hear and read more and more often of the relationship in social organization of centralism, democratism and liberalism. One of the most important areas in this sphere of problems is the question of the relationship of democratic and liberal criticism. The decisive difference between the two--at the level of theoretical typology, used here throughout, which examines in theoretically clear, abstract form the basic types merging in reality in concrete alloys--is that while the former moves between certain tolerances, it is limited to an inner judgment of the given basic structure, and, operating in the name of a definite value order, limits and seeks to reject voices representing other value systems; in essence, on the other hand, the latter does not recognize limiting conditions and thus it becomes formal, therefore harmless and easily integrated. Bourgeois democracy, for example, stands in the defense of bourgeois ideals and consistently harries criticism formed from the workers' point of view. However, when the automatism of bourgeois power have been built up and consolidated, the formal freedom of expressing a view may be introduced, tolerance vis-a-vis varying value systems, parliamentarianism, etc, universal suffrage, of which Engels notes, pointing ironically to its formal character: "In the modern state it is assumed that every citizen is ripe for judging those questions on which he must vote." (Marx-Engels: WORKS 20, p 6)

The perfection of liberalism in the opinion-formation area takes place in modern capitalism where they succeed in creating mechanisms by which every form of opposition is integrated, every form of nonconformism can be made to conform, and in the tolerated pluralism of the value systems all kinds of criticism is neutralized (Istvan Hermann: THE PROBLEMS OF TODAY'S CULTURE, Kossuth 1974, 126 pages). Where there are no honored and definite values, there is nothing to fear from criticism because in essence it does not know what to direct itself against. The criticism is ineffective because from the outset the subject of the criticism cannot be grasped. This ideologically liberal guidance of society which, with the help of the apparent objectivity of formal freedom, makes it impossible for the individual

to question as a whole the given system, or deny the system, and thus excludes the seeking of an alternative that exceeds the bounds of the existing structure--according to its bourgeois critics also--and is simply a transmission manifestation of a form of power working with refined means. For example, Herbert Marcuse apprehends well the substantive identity of liberalism with centralist social organization: "The rule--in the guise of affluence and freedom--extends to every sphere of private and public existence, integrates all actual opposition, and swallows every alternative. Technological rationality reveals its political character in that it becomes the grand carrier of a better rule and creates an actually totalitarian universe in which society and nature, mind and body alike are kept in a condition of permanent mobilization in the defense of this universe" (THE ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN).

Similar to the bourgeois democratic system, socialist democratism also stands as the defender of its own basic interests, and thus of necessity moves between tolerance limits. The positive limiting condition is the following: it makes it possible for everyone to know something about everything if his capabilities permit, and to participate in discussing all those matters that he understands. The "negative" limiting condition is: everyone is responsible for those processes which he helped to discuss. The responsibility is, to be sure, a far-reaching "personal relation: we should form our deeds in such a way that we can always accept authorship. Hence, forward, and concentrating on the future let us form our decisions in such a way that our personal nature, our best energies should be given place, considering that subsequently we will again be responsible for the consequences with our entire being." (Miklos Almasi: FORCED TRAJECTORY, Magveto [Publishers], 1977, 250 pages) Accordingly, democratic criticism excludes the questioning of socialist basic principles and of the value system. It is responsible to society, or it has the responsibility for error. But it is this responsibility that is the guarantee of its communal nature. As the criterion of the collective type of election is the recall, so in socialism the main characteristic of democratic judgment is accountability.

Since it presents itself with the intention of effective change, responsible criticism must be theoretically well founded and scientifically demanding; its value judgments constantly derive from analyses of different points of view. "To be radical means as much," says Marx, "as grasping the matter by the roots." (Marx-Engels: WORKS I, p 385) According to this statement, all radicalism assumes on one hand a scientific knowledge of work, reality or objectivity, and on the other hand a subjective activity extending to the bases, the "grasping by the roots." A knowledge of social "matter" thereafter includes both general theoretical and historically very concrete elements. Thus it requires in fact a concrete judgment which does not disregard world historical interrelationships and is, therefore, embedded in theory, while it accepts unavoidable compromises, resolutely rejects those that conflict with basic principles. It is only in this way that a grasping of the unified process in events and eras can come about, and also harmony in the judgment of individual phenomena: a contradictory view of social movements in their entirety and a unified view of their contradictions.

If these criteria are rejected there is a slide over to liberal criticism. The main characteristic of the latter is to give room for partial criticism, which is confined to untheoretical, unhistorical questioning of detailed episodes, and, therefore, even if the intention is an internal goal of improvement, it can be converted into the objectively external, into opposition because of its inexactness. The legalization of criticism which does away with democratic limiting conditions occurs in this way, which leads of necessity to the lack of a collective viewpoint and then of responsibility. The irresponsible or external condition which has gained ground in this way counterpoises and thereby degrades and neutralizes radical positive criticism in the above sense. Because of this leveling, every criticism becomes objectively valuefree and loses its social weight; it does not signify the taking of a position, the undertaking of something. Its only effect is the easing of the conscience by putting the matter into words. Thus the liberal freedom of criticism becomes from the outset synonymous with the lack of outcome. In essence, anyone can criticize anything in any way and without any kind of consequence: on one hand, the irresponsible critic is not hurt, and on the other hand, the phenomenon that soundly and rightly has been objected to remains unchanged. That is, the liberal freedom of criticism is nothing more than an apology for the status quo: a declaration of the senseless, superficial nature of criticism. In this way there is no substantive difference between the centralism which tolerates no criticism and the liberalism which proliferates it.

In the period of a centralist-type guidance of a socialist state, the communal tasks (or those judged so) of individuals are fixed essentially in central decisions, instructions from above--something which has two consequences. On one hand, the independent area of mobility for the individual is extremely narrowed; the necessity for compliance with the instructions frees the individual from taking a position, forming an opinion, and choosing among alternatives. On the other hand--in response to the above--his responsibility is also reduced to the exact carrying out of instructions, which (if he can identify with the tasks he is given) creates for him a psychically comfortable situation: the results of his work are easily and rapidly verifiable. The burden of decisions and the formation of views does not weigh on the individual since the prescribed goals and tasks are clear and unambiguous--in this way their fulfillment can result in the idea and the pathos of directly useful, rational communal activity. The "social charge," the instructions that are to be carried out is a safeguard against purposeless busy work and against uncertainty. The greater psychical ease--possibly--of this atmosphere is noted by Makarenko, who says of the individuals' subordination to command and to the commander: "In certain respects, it is even a pleasure for them. They feel they have a center, a leader who is responsible for them." (Makarenko, *WORKS IN EDUCATIONAL THEORY*, Tankonyvkiado [Textbook Publishers] 1965, 195 pp)

The more decentralized types of social organization increase the individual's opportunities for actively participating in shaping his own lot and the external processes (in society, the workplace, etc). The opportunity for

personal decisions and choices is more, however, than a mere possibility: it is at the same time a decisionmaking pressure, which after the expiration of compulsory central prescriptions becomes an autonomous attitudinal mode for defining one's own lot and finding the goals set for the person. Thus the wrong choices and such as give no verification of results, or the burden of not making the choices that are possible fall on the individual. His tasks are not prescribed, he must stand good for himself. Since to find one's own way in the world, to exploit the increased area of mobility in such a way that the clear verifications of execution, self-justification can assure a picture of subjective certainty is essentially more difficult, and therefore this situation results in a greater psychical burden, frequently in a turn to greater uncertainty, self-torments, and a bad public feeling. Indeed, a self-sacrificing communal service, a disciplined execution of instructions received requires considerably less nervous and psychical command than the working out and carrying out of individual bents, a social pursuit of capabilities, the undertaking of the seriousness of personality, which require constant effort.

In this way the question of responsibility also becomes more complicated. On one hand, because the responsibility of execution is supplemented by the responsibility of goal and task definition, and, on the other hand, because the individual becomes responsible to himself for his decisions, and for defining his own lot. He can be constantly faced thereby with such tormenting questions as: What would be socially his rational personal tasks? Is he suited to his work and calling? Is he working above or far below his talents? What would be both personally and socially his best activity? A retreat from the anguishing dilemmas--which may occur because of inability to make choices, ineffective efforts, etc--may easily lead to a turning away (at different levels) from a reality that "does not want to listen to a wise word." But it can also lead to a situation where--because the chosen activity requires a complete personality and intensive presence--flees from undertaking the task of struggling for an autonomous life, from seeking out opportunities for making decisions and for activity suited to himself, and escapes to ready schemes on the beaten track for a reflexive activity. He settles himself in the uniformity of impersonal endeavor mechanisms serving the forgetting of one's self, typical diversions, and an existence without independence and independent efforts. The alternative of life suitability as opposed to the inability to make decisions and taking impersonal paths does not come about, of course, spontaneously. Such an alternative may be represented by everyday practice, an actually democratic public life which will successfully bring out latent values in the individual; does not leave to himself the burden of finding the social activity suited to his capabilities. This is manifested in that, on one hand, it faces him with expectations, builds up his sense of responsibility and the demands on himself, and, on the other hand, it gives orientation support for successful self-determination and in finding the goal system dimensioned to his personality. Democratic criticism represents an effective base point for the individual in the solution of this task.

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OPTIMISTIC REPORTS ON POSITION OF GYPSIES REFUTED

Budapest KRITIKA in Hungarian No 10, Oct 79

[Article by Zsolt Csalog: "Gypsy Village in Baranya"]

[Text] Until the 1920's, Alsoszentmarton in Baranya was a Sokac [Southern Slav ethnic group]-German peasant village. The entire large Gypsy community lived in a Gypsy site next to the settlement. It was in 1920 that a Gypsy family for the first time purchased a dwelling within the village from a Sokac peasant--and the last Sokac family left the village in the summer of 1977. The process which extended over a half century did not go on at an even rate; the "flight" of the original population experienced a great upswing in the early 1970's, and assumed the form of a panic. The homogenization of the settlement--the establishment of the country's first Gypsy village--was at first received enthusiastically by the Gypsies. But with the end of the process, it is rather the problems stemming from the development that have come to the foreground in recent years.

A New Ghetto Being Formed

These problems merit particular attention because the development which can be observed at this village in Baranya expresses a general trend: many villages in Baranya, in Transdanubia and in the northern parts of the country (so-called "minivillages") have started on the path of homogenization of the Alsoszentmarton type, and the phenomenon is also somewhat analagous to a process by which certain tanya [isolated farm house] areas in the Alföld and in big city areas are becoming Gypsy--and in this way casts light on the entire present Gypsy question. It would be important for us to perceive the progress of the Gypsies into settlement concentrations having possession of well-considered experiences that are well utilized also at the level of common knowledge.

The migration process of the original peasant population from Alsoszentmarton meant at the same time the gradual reduction of the population in the Gypsy outskirt settlement which did not meet social requirements: as inner peasant houses became vacant, families from the Gypsy outskirts moved in. The end of the process was also for the first time accompanied by the consequence

that the inward migration was stopped because there were no more houses to be purchased. In 1977, 220 persons, about one-fifth of the village's now completely Gypsy population, lived in Gypsy sites on the outskirts. Crowded conditions in the site were considerably reduced, but its character as a poverty location did not end. The technical level of the buildings, with a few exceptions, is below minimal norms, there are no paved roads, no sidewalks, and drinking-water problems are serious, etc., etc. As of now, there is no realistic hope for finally eliminating the site or the rehabilitation of the buildings (put at 34 in number by the council, but which in fact are more than that). This is all the more so because the social policy designed to eliminate the site is selective in principle, whereas the population living there is already strongly counterselected: these families--old people, broken families, families with many children, down-and-outers who have lost their footing in life--are not capable of savings, nor can they find a steady work relation, and thus they are excluded from preferential opportunities for obtaining housing. The council would have provided applicants repayment-free housing, and plan types for this purpose were ready in 1977--but the construction capacity could not be found, and since the applicants would have had to pay 70,000 forints over and above the loan, taking 1977 prices as the base, there were no applicants and none could be expected. The elimination of the site could be accomplished only by a rapid, concentrated program, for the tactic of proceeding by small steps cannot lead to success: if only two to three program houses are built every year this will only keep pace with natural reproduction, and the site with its present dimensions and relations will be preserved over the long run. The lower level administrative leaders--sensing the bankrupt situation--pin their hope for the elimination of the site on the dying out of the old population, at the same time abandoning those living at the sites to a lifelong existence at a level below our social norms. This way of thinking can be censured not only on moral grounds but also because it is entirely erroneous from the viewpoint of final prospects since the outskirt-site form of existence is handed down as a model.

We can put Alsoszentmarton in the "withering" or "stagnating" category of Hungary's villages. The characteristic of this category is that communal development is backward and is condemned to go on being so. It is indicated by the one-sidedly negative migration balance--the population is increasing in Alsoszentmarton, but this derives from a specially high fertility, the increase being realized without immigration and despite strong emigration endeavors. Related hereto is another characteristic of the withering and stagnating village classification: in Szentmarton the sales value of houses is below their technical value. An inner village house purchased for 160,000 forints in 1975 was sold for 250,000 forints in 1977--the value of a technically equivalent house in Siklos or Villany is close to a half million forints. If someone were to build a house in Alsoszentmarton for 200,000 forints, he could not sell it for 150,000 forints because of the lack of buyers with ability to pay; if he were to build a house in Kiklos for 200,000 forints, he would be able to sell the finished house for 300,000 forints. All this leads to the fact that in Alsoszentmarton no one builds a new house from his own resources.

At the most--in case of extreme necessity--on the outskirts site, at the outskirts level. This happens despite a legal prohibition.

Considering its basic situation, Alsoszentmarton shares the common fate of minivillages--in the case of which, however, the outlined situation leads generally to a speeding up of spontaneous emigration. It would appear obvious that we would hope for a solution to the outskirts tensions in Alsoszentmarton, too, by way of accelerating emigration. It is the natural endeavor of people living in backwardly situated villages to move from their areas of residence with their declining values and limited livelihood possibilities to settlements where the communal and infrastructural facilities are better, their position on the labor market more favorable, and where there "is a future"--and although such migration processes have their drawbacks (the problem of the counterselected population that remains behind, and the leading role of the economic-cultural levels as related to the national distribution of the migration, for example, in Baranya the Germans first, followed by the Hungarians and Southern Slavs, and finally the Gypsies), but still it represents some natural regulation, and a partial loosening of tensions. In the case of the Gypsy-inhabited Alsoszentmarton, however, this conduit does not function, or only very haltingly. Public feeling in the settlement since it was taken over has been ambivalent: the positive element is given by comparison with the mixed nationality era (when constant friction and humiliations resulted from living together--for example, the Gypsies could not enter the inn that was maintained for the Sokac people), and the Szentmartonites are indeed proud of the village they have acquired--but at the same time they more and more sense the absurdity of their new situation, their backward situation as compared to the surrounding settlements, and the involuntary isolation. This public feeling and natural assimilatory effort of the Gypsies should represent an adequate impetus to expansion. The Gypsy society at Alsoszentmarton is materially and culturally differentiated enough so that the process of the emigration of the original inhabitants should continue: in wake of the Sokac families, the "better" Gypsy families are also continually entering the migration dynamics that characterizes the region as a whole. There are two reasons why it is being realized only to a very limited extent. On one hand, it is the low material potential in regional comparison--the "better" families of Szentmarton represent a higher material level only in local relations, and very few of them have the means to buy a house in the "target" settlements. The other reason is that the regional environment is rigidly closed to accepting them and strongly guards against Gypsy expansion. This is how the village they have bought becomes a forced place of residence, a ghetto, and this is how the flush of victory becomes distorted into a ghetto psychosis.

The general mode of "self-defense" used by the surrounding settlements is to try to make housing purchases by the Gypsy families from the outside impossible. Those selling a house are under pressure from their neighbors, and if actions limited to the private sphere--persuasion and intimidation--do not yield results, they make use of the local council's help, either by personal "pull" or by appeal to the "public interest" of the settlement. And

frequently they do so successfully: the local officials are also inclined to view the interests of the residential community in the narrow concept of defense against the Gypsies. Of course there is no legal obstacle against a Gypsy family's buying a house in any settlement whatsoever within the framework of the state credit program--thus "defense" is realized through formal violations of the law. The most simple form is to give false information to applicants--as a consequence of which, for example, it is a general misconception in Szentmarton that the state credit program does not extend to cities in the area or to the special industrial centers (Siklos, Villany, Beremend, Harkany, etc). In 1977, I collected data on this subject in Alsoszentmarton and environs--the stories of the unsuccessful migration attempts are preserved on magnetic tape. It is difficult to catch violators of the law in the act, it is not easy to have textual revelations concerning defense strategy related into the microphone--but it is not impossible. An inexperienced official or one who has lost his self-control goes public and pronounces: "...as a matter of fact it is not a goal of ours to move the Gypsies into Siklos from Alsoszentmarton...We do not urge it, if possible we avoid it...Perhaps I put it incorrectly, actually we cannot avoid it; if an application is submitted, and the statutory provision has nothing against it, we actually give the opportunity...Well, actually the endorsement of the city council is necessary." The interviewer asked: "What kind of endorsement is necessary from the city council?" "The endorsement of the city council is actually not necessary. The city council inspects the technical structure of the building, this is its only task..." And this was the opinion of the vice chairman of the local executive committee who perceived the situation of the Gypsies in Alsoszentmarton very well and had their interests at heart: "...the population influences the councils also, and this is where it comes from...this is the opposition of the population itself. If this is what I had always looked at, my site would still be standing there with 700 people! The council must not be so prejudiced as to listen to the neighbors, this Gypsy is just as much its client as the neighbor!...If the other councils go at it as they have up to now, the council where there are no Gypsies--it would be no use for them to try to disperse, Siklos will not accept them, Beremend will not accept them--it is of no use for us to help settle them in other communities!...There is no legal ground in that place, nothing else...except they do not want to sell and let the Gypsies move in: such prejudice...and it was owing to this that it became a Gypsy village, because the other villages would not accept them...They would go--but it won't work like this. It won't work like this, I say: simply not one council will accept them, will not accept them!...We simply do not know what to do."

Assimilation Efforts in a Blind Alley

In spite of popular views, we must state that by far most Gypsies in Hungary are characterized by ambitions to assimilate. (The most general motive for the intention or desire to emigrate from Alsoszentmarton is the following: "if we move among Hungarian neighbors, the children will learn Hungarian faster and better, the children and adults will take on 'good' customs more easily, while in the homogenous village we learn only 'bad' habits from one

another." For the fitting of Gypsies into society, guidelines related to the Gypsy question do not give preference to the assimilative over the integrative course (when it seeks its place in the great society as a whole by maintaining its racial-linguistic-cultural minority identity and guarding its community framework) but endeavors to assure both possibilities in a parallel way. Since in our society being a Gypsy means being looked down on and living in a disadvantageous position, most of the Gypsies would want to assimilate into the majority without leaving a trace, and an integration program suggested by a small circle of Gypsy intellectuals has had little response up to now at the popular level. But if the assimilation efforts of the individual run one after another into barriers set up by the majority society, the path of assimilation will become one that cannot be followed and ambitions will turn necessarily toward strengthening the common consciousness of the Gypsy community--this turn is already a new development that can be felt in the sprouting seed of Hungary's Gypsy question. It is difficult to link a value judgment to this phenomenon. The strengthening of identity consciousness can have a positive role in a group of people who are "becoming mature," even if in a difficult situation this element of consciousness receives a somewhat compensatory function. If, however, identity consciousness becomes the basis of nationalist ideologies, its strengthening can be judged as a phenomenon with negative effect. And if the internal integration of the Gypsies is realized at a material and cultural level below the social average it can easily become a trap: a means for intensifying segregation.

In the case of Alsoszentmarton, segregation has been realized in the spatial sense with the homogenization of the village, and this brings with itself the development of social segregation in the broader sense. The disadvantageous situation of the Gypsy village is evident in two ways: on one hand, Alsoszentmarton is a so-called minivillage, in regional planning it belongs in the stagnant category (not to be developed, but kept at the same level) and hence its relative backwardness in the regional field will only increase--and in part this is why it became Gypsy; on the other hand, it is a Gypsy-inhabited village, and it is classified as such in the regional environment. It is a characteristic contradiction: condemned to stagnation, Alsoszentmarton with its population of more than 1,000 persons is the largest village in the council district--and still the council center and the tsz [agricultural producer cooperative] center is in the smallest village, the Hungarian-inhabited Egyhazasharasz.

The specific content of the disadvantageous situation is manifold: the low level of communal facilities; the total lack of small-scale industrial service, the deficient nature of the schools (there is no upper section in the local general school), etc--but outstandingly important are the labor disadvantages. I shall detail these in the following.

Commuting Workers

There is practically no place to work in the village. The storekeeper, the innkeeper and--with one exception--the teachers come from outside the village

while all the workers in Alsoszentmarton work outside the village. The main commuting data are the following: Workers at the Dravaszabolcs Linen Factory are away from home 12-13 hours, from 6 in the morning to 6-7 at night. The workers at Mohacs work and travel from 5 in the morning to 7:30 at night; at Beremend from 5 in the morning to 4 in the afternoon. Workers at Pecs are away from home for 13-14 hours. The nearest work places are the tax center at Egyhazasharasz, (4 kilometers) and Siklos (11 kilometers); in these cases the problems are caused more by insufficient mass transport (too few runs, incredibly crowded conditions, frequent lack of space). Generally, for greater distances, it is the buses or trucks of the employer which transport the workers--and in these cases the travel time is considerably prolonged by the fact that vehicles pick up workers from a number of widely separated villages.

"Please if something can be done, try to help the Romanian workers at Alsoszentmarton. One plant, one factory where the local people could work and would not have to wander to Pecs, Komlo, Mohacs, or to some who-knows-where place!...This is how we could provide the workers with a living standard! If there were only a plant here, lumber yard, anything which you would think is all right that could be located here in Alsoszentmarton, or there could even be two plants, this would be the most intelligent and realistic...with this the state would be helping us, but we too would be helping the state because if it is a question of working 9 hours not 8--we could work 9 because it would be in the village! But this way we are not working 9 or 10 but 12 and even 14 hours. We leave home at 5 and return at 2 or 9 if we have engine trouble!" (Portions of an interview.) But there is no serious thought being given to establishing an industry. In response to my question, the executive committee chairman said: "No, no we know nothing of such a thing... No, there can't be now, Siklos just became a city and that is where the industrial site will be...They are going to have express runs for them, and then we will build better on that." The village party secretary said: "There has been no local initiative for an industrial site...but it would be possible to set up a basketweaving plant because they make baskets at home...Unfortunately, there is no other possibility for the time being...No use, the megye does not--it cannot, it cannot! But they come for them in buses, comfortable buses, a small nice bus comes for three persons, if you please... from Pecs, for example!" The district office said: "Szentmarton is in a district plan category not recommended for industrial sites. That is, level maintenance, not development, is called for. It is a village without a sphere of activity. Therefore, it is not indicated for any large investment to the year 2000..."

But the generally given counterargument to establishing local workplaces is the anticipated development of nearby Siklos. The district office said: "Siklos will have places for hiring them, Siklos will have the capacity for hiring...and it is not a long way off...it is not far by bus and they can easily go there...Siklos is dealing in a maximum way with new industrial site concepts and has held discussions with a number of firms about light industry relations..." In addition to the fact that this solution, despite the relatively short distance (11 kilometers), does not avoid the disadvantages

of commuting and will be realized only with inadequate transport conditions, moderate hopes are also made questionable by the continuation of the above statement: "It is true though that the employers...outside of City Management...do not welcome hiring them. And if a light industry being relocated from the capital city should come...they will not for that reason set as their primary goal the hiring of Gypsies."

The age composition of the Alsoszentmarton population is a determining factor in the status of employment. In 1969, the ratio of persons of working age was 47.2 percent; in 1977, 50.1 percent (the estimates--including the following as well--were prepared on the basis of data compiled by the local council). It follows also from the poor biological status of the population that among those of working age the ratio of the more elderly is very low: 5.9 or 6.3 percent. Accordingly, the low ratio of those of working age derives from the high ratio of minors (46.9 or 45.6 percent) and from high fertility--in 1970, live births per 1,000 were around 30 per 1,000 or more, far above the national or regional average. Two other factors are expressed in the development of the ratio of earners. After the completion of general school, the number of earners is not reduced by those who continue their education, for such do not actually exist. A significant dead weight, however, in the active age group is represented by the large number unable to work because of illness and disability. (Besides the high fertility--which is scarcely declining, or at best only here and there in small villages--a nationally determining factor in our Gypsy question is the poor biological condition of the adult age groups. Unfortunately, we do not have exact data on Alsoszentmarton--but we do have 1971 data on two somewhat similar Gypsy villages: in Jaszfenyszaru the average age is 23.4 years (men) or 26.3 years (women) and at the Romanian gypsy market site at Barcs 17.6 years and 18.3 years respectively--these are lower than were found in Hungarian peasant villages in the middle of the 19th century.) To a significant extent, therefore, it is not employment weaknesses but the specifics of age composition which result in the fact that for every earner (steady or part-time employee) in Alsoszentmarton there are 1.23 dependents (the national average in 1970 was 0.82, and the average for Hungary's Gypsy households in 1971 was 2.24). This condition in itself results in a lower income level in Gypsy settlements than for the average population. In 1977, only 16.6 percent of the active age groups in Alsoszentmarton were not earners (some were disabled and invalid, but more were women unable to work because they had several children or because there was a lack of work possibilities, nurseries and kindergartens) while one-third of the active age group is also made up of earners.

Agricultural Season--Manpower

We can discover further important reasons for the disadvantageous situation by analyzing the employment structure. The ratio employed in industry (construction industry and transportation) is strikingly low: 14.4 percent of the earners in 1969, and 11.7 percent of the earners in 1977 (in absolute figures there was an increase, but the ratio declined). Even more striking is the low ratio of those with steady employment in agriculture: 5.5 percent

of the earners in 1977 (here the absolute number has declined since 1969). In comparison, about 50 percent of the employed in 1969 had only seasonal agricultural work (partly in the Egyhazasharaszti tsz, which includes the border of the village itself, and partly in the more removed tsz's of the environs and state farms, frequently at a distance of 20-30 kilometers).

It is a historical fact, nationally determining also for the Gypsy question, that land distribution in 1945 did not grant land to the agrarian-proletarian Gypsies, who were for the most part living in villages and were in significant proportion agricultural day laborers: the Gypsies either did not ask for land, or received none if they did. Alsoszentmarton was one of the exceptions in this respect: many of the Gypsies living in this village, which was becoming strongly Gypsy in character, asked for land, and somewhat fewer were successful. In the years of ruin for the new owners, they were of course the first to go bankrupt since they had no reserves, equipment or production experience, and the yoke-usury of the Sokac owners afflicted them the most cruelly. Therefore there were many Gypsies among the members of the tsz that was formed with the first collectivization. After the disintegration of this cooperative, the Alsoszentmarton Gypsies formed their own separate tsz. The short-lived Gypsy cooperative was weak and the members left it for a more secure livelihood. When subsequently the only Szentmarton tsz merged into the neighboring Egyhazasharaszti cooperative, it hardly brought in any Gypsy member, only the rear guard of the village's Sokac population. This is one explanation for the fact that the Egyhazasharaszti tsz, which also uses the borders of Alsoszentmarton, unites the boundaries of five villages, and has a membership of 625 persons--and is the nearest possible workplace to Szentmarton--has 14 members and a constant labor supply from Szentmarton, which is the most populous of the five villages. The other explanation is that the tsz tries to hold the Gypsies at a distance, seeks to make of them a reserve army for the seasonal work peaks. In the 1940's, it was to the advantage of the Gypsies that they were forced out of the manpower base for the large agricultural farms--but this has not been true since the middle of the 1960's and the consolidation of the cooperatives. Seasonal agricultural work, however, is clearly disadvantageous. Not only in its totality does it mean lower or uneven income but also deprivation from preferences and allowances--above all, pensions--over and above wages. But the given system is stabilized by tradition and the fact that large farms, in addition to the present production profile, cannot do without seasonal manpower. According to the grotesque-sounding arguments of the managers, everyone does well..."for these intermittent jobs are to their benefit. Pea harvesting lasts for a week or two--and they are paid right away. Thus they can acquire material means. They receive their daily wage immediately..." (School administrator). "The Gypsies do not themselves demand continuous employment through the entire year. Seasonal employment in spring, summer and autumn is enough for the women, they do not want employment in the winter. Because they get some means together in the summer, and in the winter they vegetate." (District Office, Labor Division). "I do not think that the women want to have steady employment...The degree of mechanization in the producer cooperatives is very high, our sowing structure has also developed in such a way that we need to hire few manual workers, for the attraction of the BOM [Berend

Cement Works] in winning over manpower is very great. Well, it comes from this that we need manual workers only seasonally--and naturally this is where we obtain them..." (Tsz chairman). "Well, they have become used to this!" (Council leader). In addition to the system as it developed, the other base of reference is that "because of their lack of training, the Gypsy population is suited only for this kind of employment (sic!)" (District Office, Labor Division)--and in itself this is an argument difficult to refute. In the absence of firm sociopolitical intervention, the interwar system is essentially preserved in this way: we maintain a barefoot reserve basis according to the needs of large agricultural plants.

On the Periphery of the Labor Market

We can regard it as a success that 44 percent of the Szentmarton male work force is steadily employed (the female labor force is another matter of which only 5 percent has steady work relation--and here the employment problem could be solved only through local places of work). Serious dangers are latent, however, in the circumstance that on the regional labor market, a separate category of occupations and workplaces is coming into being, "the Gypsy work areas": such jobs as non-Gypsies generally will not accept because these jobs are 1) physically difficult, 2) harmful to the health, 3) held in low esteem (for example, poundmasters, street cleaners), and 4) underpaid because of contingencies of the wage policy. Street cleaning is an area of work that is reserved in Siklos for Gypsies, and likewise poundmaster tasks fall to the lot of the Alsoszentmartonites in the area (this is carried out on an independent undertaking basis); they are accepted into the Park Building Enterprise at Pecs, the Dravaszabolcs Linen Factory (here they perform work that is seriously harmful to the health in the retting pit, in the open air standing in water through an entire shift, the brick factory, the stone quarry, and there are also possibilities in the coal mine and in the Pecs leather factory. According to the (Sokac) leader of the council agency, the Gypsies have free choice to seek workplaces for themselves where they wish, naturally accepting at the same time the commuting problems that go with it--this "free choice," however, in practice means something less than freedom because where they are in competition with non-Gypsy labor, the odds are heavily against them. This is the story on one side: "The City Management Enterprise has a positive attitude toward their employment and suitability, it does not shut itself off from them. There was a case in earlier times when a partially disabled Gypsy came to me with his medical papers...we knocked on the doors of the City Management, and in every case like this the person was employed...In fact, there were cases in which the Gypsy was sick, and they put him to work on the side streets rather than on the main routes, this is how humanely the enterprise dealt with them!" (District Office, Labor Division). And this is the other side of the picture: "The construction of the BCM was proceeding as a special investment and the general designers did not like to employ them...it was of course a state investment...and they did not employ them willingly." (Labor Division). "There are certain enterprises or places of work that do not come here when they can extend their manpower hiring to non-Gypsies. They come here to recruit Gypsy labor only when they cannot find workers elsewhere...The various

enterprises look at the matter this way: if they can solve their problem, to put it plainly, without hiring Gypsies, then they will. They will come here only in the most extreme case." (Leader of the council agency).

Again we are dealing here with a national trend: Gypsy labor is being increasingly forced to the periphery of the labor market and work areas "reserved" for Gypsies are developing. And this again leads in the direction of segregation, similar to forced settlement concentrations. In the background of this process, we can distinguish three main causes:

The determining factor is the low qualification level, the insufficient education of Gypsy labor. Alsoszentmarton is characterized by untrained mass labor. Only a few have training in skilled work (but in general do not find work appropriate to their training). Because of space considerations I shall not detail the educational interrelationships of the situation, but purely by way of characterization I shall state: the parents of those in school at present are illiterate in significant ratio, or semi-illiterate, or their native tongue is Romanian and they speak Hungarian poorly, there is no education in the schools in their native language, the teachers do not speak the language of their pupils and do not even know what kind of language it is, the pupils go into the neighboring village for upper division classes, there is not a single book in the village library written in the native language of a homogenous nationality population, etc, etc. These problems naturally merit attention here too, and not only in labor relations. "The first is whether he is trained or untrained, whether he has finished the eighth grade or not. And most of them have not. And since they do not have the eight grades of general school, they are automatically regarded as untrained...Thus naturally the employers can hire them only as unskilled and semi-skilled workers. This is a determining factor." (District Office).

The other given reason, or stock phrase, is that Gypsy labor--independent of the degree of training--is of low value. Here it is partly the matter of an objective factor; naturally, the gypsies who came from a situation of unemployment between the two world wars cannot stand from the work-morality point of view on the same level as human material of peasant origin which has been reared since the grain prosperity of the past century in a strict work morality that is now native. Such a generalization, however, is prejudiced and incorrect. Rather general is a much less often mentioned type of Gypsy worker who driven by assimilation efforts, accepts, despite inadequate biological makeup such work as he can get, and--again because of the deficiency of traditions proves unable to manage with his physical condition--he strains himself to perform to such an extent that it leads to biological damage (this phenomenon is one of the causes of their generally poor biological conditions). From the viewpoint of the employers, this kind of labor cannot be exactly described as of poor quality.

Increasing Prejudices

As the third cause for the marginalization of the labor market, we can name the generally prejudiced attitude of the society in the environs (as in the

case of settlement segregation). Few systems of prejudice which have been experienced rest on rational arguments, and in fact they simply speak of the racial and cultural difference of the Gypsies. Obviously, this is the most serious factor obstructing a solution to the Gypsy problem. When prejudices evident in our society are brought up, we put it in the customary way by speaking of "relics of the past," and "still existing" prejudices. The truth is that in many sectors of our social consciousness, prejudices are reformed, strengthened, and activated--and nowadays the picture as a whole is more frightening than it was one or two decades ago. Without trying to describe more broadly and analyze this complicated sociopsychological phenomenon, I would only point out several apparent causes of the worsening situation: a role may be played here by signs pointing the other way from the process which has occurred and is occurring parallel with the settlement concentration, the appearance and concentration of Gypsies in formerly closed, non-Gypsy residential areas--it is in this way that the contact and friction area grows, and rejection is given voice. The establishment of a "guest workers' front" in the big cities and the industrial centers has a similar effect and makes into an everyday matter the necessary contact of classes with a different cultural level. Finally, a general differentiation may be of importance which began to appear in the 1960's--understandably the differentiation stresses and makes into a neurological problem the increasing "difference" of human groups.

"The blacks (sic!) are hired where the whites(!) do not want to accept jobs, or they leave...but we are all right for it." "...It's no use because I am black. We blacks cannot get the good jobs. I don't want to be political, because they will say..." The Alsoszentmarton interviews fixed a series of labor matter narrations according to which labor recruitment of the establishment of a local work shop as initiated by the population came to an end when the enterprise became aware that it had to do with Gypsies and a Gypsy village--"and in the end when they saw black, they may have felt nausea when they saw black, when they saw the black they had to vomit from the black. Perhaps they thought that we were white, or that we were Sokac people..." Even if we discount what derives perhaps from only the sensitivity of the suffering party, it still says too much.

A detailed analysis could easily reveal the disadvantageous situation of the Gypsy village as it developed and became increasingly worse. However, we rarely come upon an attempt at realistic analysis by lower level leaders, who have important influence in the development of the situation. Instead of a careful thinking through of the problems, we encounter mostly parables about the "good Gypsy." "There are hiring possibilities and there is an employer's demand for their employment, and there are many working here at the firm who have proved worthy of confidence, I must add!" "I give it only as an example for I have known Peter too for a long time, he was a simple young swineherd, and he stood out. He came in from the site and bought a house in Alsoszentmarton, and they are living beautifully, he works in the lumber yard, earns 3,000-3,200 forints, you couldn't even drive him away, he is such a good man, you can trust him with anything, and they say about him that it would be good if every Hungarian were as honorable--this is what

they say at his enterprise." This presentation is suited for covering the sociological problems and the deficiencies of sociopolitical practice: it represents the situation as if every Gypsy, the Gypsies in mass and as a whole could raise themselves up if "they put themselves together," and "held their place honorably"--that is, if someone cannot raise himself up, he should blame himself. (The low level of consciousness among many of the Gypsies is indicated by the fact that the attitude as portrayed is frequently taken over by Gypsies themselves; we can often hear from a beginning assimilated the lesson he has learned: "Anyone who wants to work now can work. There is always opportunity for work, only you have to like the work and do it.") With my analysis I wanted to point out that the opportunities of a Gypsy village are determined--delimited--primarily by external factors, the moves in the surrounding great society and it cannot in a significant way alter this through its own strength.

This is not the first time that Alsoszentmarton, "the purchased village," has appeared in the Hungarian press. I intended the foregoing as critical comment on earlier reports regarding the Gypsy village (VALOSAG 1975/6; NOK LAPJA 1979/32-33) but in a more general way on a frequently superficial reporting or information practice which in the final analysis distorts public opinion.

6691

CSO: 2500

COMMENTATOR CALLS ON WEST TO PURSUE MILITARY DETENTE

Warsaw SLOWO POWSZECHNE in Polish 24 Oct 79 p 4

[Article by Tadeusz Pioro: "Between Belgrade and Madrid"]

[Text] Four years ago all European countries except Albania, as well as the United States and Canada signed a document in Helsinki which they regarded as a "code of conduct" in international relations: The concluding Act of the Conference on European Security and Cooperation. Two years later, representatives of the 35 signatory states met in Belgrade to strike the first balance on the implementation of the Act's postulates. Signatories will meet in Madrid next year to again evaluate what has and what has not been accomplished.

However, it can be said today that although some improvement has been achieved in relations between the Conference on European Security and Cooperation participants, that nevertheless the results are disappointing--considering the hopes placed on the Helsinki Conference. Concrete results were attained thanks only to two-sided contacts and agreements between signatories: political, economic and cultural relations were expanded, separated families were able to reunite, and several steps were taken with respect to military detente.

In the opinion of socialist states these accomplishments are far from satisfactory. The West, on the other hand, constantly citing "the spirit of the Helsinki Conference," continuously keeps accusing Socialist states of not respecting Conference resolutions. In turn, while rejecting all efforts at interference in their internal affairs, socialist states are striving to have the Helsinki Act respected on an equal basis by all.

The Helsinki document devotes relatively little space to reconstruction of the security system on our continent. It speaks only of prior notification of large scale troop maneuvers and movements, as well as of an exchange of observers for such maneuvers. Although these steps undoubtedly have a positive implication for lessening military tension, they in no way limit any state's military potential. Since the signing of the "Good Will Act" in Helsinki, no progress has been made in the talks in Vienna on the reduction

of armed forces in Europe, and thus it has not been possible to coordinate the most essential problem for European security. Meanwhile in the practice of present-day international relations it is precisely military problems which exert the greatest influence on security consciousness, and staving off the danger of the incidental use of force in a conflict situation.

Thus, Leonid Brezhnev's proposals to broaden the provisions of the Helsinki Document have real significance, that is, extending the advance notice time limits relative to military exercises, expanding this principle to include exercises in which more than 25 thousand persons participate, mutual curtailments of the number of troops participating in maneuvers to 40-50 thousand soldiers, as well as giving notice of all movements of land forces in which more than 20 thousand soldiers participate.

However, L. Brezhnev's declaration of readiness to discuss a reduction not only of intercontinental nuclear weapons within the framework of Salt II, but also of other types of nuclear weapons, as well as of a given number of medium range Soviet nuclear weapons in western USSR areas, must be recognized as the most essential point of this area of international relations. These are designated as "measures for building confidence"--independent of the decision to withdraw a substantial number of Soviet troops from Central Europe.

This last point, however, was conditional on NATO states refraining from expanding the nuclear arsenal located throughout Europe, and abandonment of the plan to exchange that arsenal for new weapons of a substantially greater range and explosive power.

Here we come to the problem which manifested itself acutely right after the Belgrade session of the Conference on European Security and Cooperation, and which undoubtedly will recur on the agenda of the next meeting of 35 states. Much points to the fact that a definite change has appeared in the status quo in Western Europe during that period. They are based on accomplishing in the near future--those NATO armament changes which the leader of the USSR mentioned as a condition of reducing Soviet nuclear weapons. These changes could occur as early as 1980 and thus hamper the development of detente tendencies.

Of course, problems of detente cannot be limited to the military problems area. If one has in mind the fact that the nonmilitary problems which highly developed countries have been grappling with for the past few years will not be alleviated, on the contrary, they will become ever more difficult, then there is no doubt that at least partial reduction is essential, not only of the trend to military domination characteristic of the USA, but also reduction from political ambitions expressed in the dogmatic adaptation of its evaluation criteria with respect to detente moves. Madrid ought not to be what Belgrade was, that is, a tribunal for mutual complaints about not fulfilling the obligations undertaken at Helsinki. If detente is to be treated as a transition from confrontation to continuing cooperation on a broad range of world problems, then it is necessary to give this process a much more dynamic character, and not avoid initiatives such as those presented by L. Brezhnev in Berlin.

10433

CSO: 2600

BRIEFS

IMPORTANCE OF BREZHNEV PROPOSALS--The constructive peace initiatives launched by Leonid Brezhnev in his Berlin speech have widely reverberated throughout the world as the announcement of a unilateral decision to reduce the number of Soviet troops, tanks and military gear stationed in the GDR as well as the readiness for talks about decreasing the level of military confrontation in Europe. These new Soviet proposals, similarly as the package of earlier initiatives concerning peace and disarmament, allow one to cherish hope that if the other side displays good-will as well, the process of international detente will be able to develop further, writes the trade union daily GLOS PRACY. In his interview for the Soviet paper Pravda, Leonid Brezhnev indicates that instead of making decisions on new perilous military undertakings, there rather should be open negotiations. The Soviet Union is ready to start such negotiations at any moment now. They might produce constructive results as there exist real premises for that. The package of peace and disarmament proposals put forth by the Soviet Union is currently the subject of numerous comments and remarks by politicians, statesmen and representatives of public opinion worldwide. The crux of the matter however is that one should pass from words to deep without delay. The platform of talks presented by the Soviet Union is clear. The talks may and should bring concrete results. [Text] [LD080820 Warsaw PAP in English 0520 GMT 8 Nov 79 LD]

KOREAN MILITARY DECISIVE INFLUENCE--Warsaw, 12 Nov, PAP--When the news about the slaying of Pak Chong-hui, the South Korean dictator, spread in Seoul, the U.S. ambassador residing there was reported as saying: "This is a military coup." The circles of the South Korean opposition that fought the dictator and his regime for many years, reacted somewhat differently. They said: "Americans finally got rid of Pak." Despite the apparent contradiction, one statement does not exclude the other, and most probably both of them give us a better idea of what really happened in South Korea, says ZYCIE WARSZAWY. The military, or the group of generals who rose to their ranks during Pak's 18-year rule, not only exercise real power in that country but also want to elect the dictator's successor by themselves. Choe Kyu-ha, the new head of the regime, is not only a figure that is completely colourless and deprived of any influence in the South Korean corridors of power, but he also stopped to be the person of any importance in

the current bid for power before he was entrusted with the caretaker function. However, it would be a mistake to think that the present bid for power in Seoul is limited only to the problem of succession. That is the question of the entire succession after the regime that was up to now in power in that country and the subsequent question: What next? The bid is now under way in Seoul and the odds are that the army, that made the best of the Pak affair, will play the crucial role in it. Perhaps the military supported by businessmen from South Korean big corporations will agree to some changes that would testify, at least seemingly, to some liberalization of the regime. However, fundamental changes lie neither in the interests of the home and foreign capital nor of the bureaucratic-police elite. Despite the fact that Pak is gone one should not expect them, or perhaps one should expect them exactly because of that, says ZYCIE WARSZAWY in conclusion. [Text] [LD121316 Warsaw PAP in English 0904 GMT 12 Nov 79 LD]

CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE TO SOVIETS--Warsaw, 6 Nov, PAP--On the occasion of the 62nd anniversary of the Great Socialist October Revolution, First Secretary of the PUPP CC Edward Gierek, President of the Council of State Henryk Jablonski and Chairman of the Council of State Piotr Jaroszewicz have sent a congratulatory message to general secretary of the CPSU CC, President of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Leonid Brezhnev and Chairman of the Council of Ministers Aleksey Kosygin, containing greetings and the best wishes. The message emphasizes that under the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union the land of the Soviets has turned into a world economic and scientific technical superpower, and plays today a key role in international relations. The Soviet consistently peaceful foreign policy enjoys full support of all the progressive and peace-loving countries in the world. In conclusion, the message underlines that People's Poland welcomes with deep appreciation the Soviet Union's new weighty decisions concerning military detente in Europe, announced by Leonid Brezhnev in Berlin last October. The Soviet Union once again gave expression of its readiness for taking concrete steps towards limiting the arms race and developing peaceful cooperation between nations. [Text] [LD070100 Warsaw PAP in English 1725 GMT 6 Nov 79 LD]

PORTUGUESE CP DELEGATION VISITS--A delegation of the Portuguese Communist Party led by Mario Sousa, member of the Central Committee Sports Commission, has visited Poland [no dates given] to study the organization and function of mass sports and the problem of cadre training and the training base. The delegation visited PZPR voivodship committees in Lodz, Piotrkow and Kalisz and some scientific centers and schools. [AU302114 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 25 Oct 79 p 4 AU]

CULTURAL ACCORD WITH EGYPT--A new 3-year executory program relating to the cultural accord and to the accord on scientific and technical cooperation between the governments of the Polish People's Republic and the Arab Republic of Egypt was signed for 1980-82 in Warsaw on 25 October. The program details the two states' cooperation in higher education and science and

provides for exchanges of study grants, direct cooperation between higher schools and development of cultural contacts. There are also provisions for cooperation in conservation of monuments. The program was signed for Poland by Vice Foreign Minister Eugeniusz Kulaga and for Egypt by Soad Bedler, vice minister of education, culture and scientific research. [Text] [Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 26 Oct 79 p 8 AU]

FRENCH-POLISH AGREEMENT--The French minister for youth, sports and leisure, Jean-Pierre Soisson, has ended his visit to Poland. He was received during his stay in Poland by Deputy Premier Tadeusz Pyka. He also had talks at the central committee for sports and physical culture and the Orbis tourist office. An agreement on cooperation was signed. Minister Soisson also opened the French institute in Warsaw. [LD270255 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1900 GMT 26 Oct 79 LD]

POLISH-CUBAN AGREEMENT--An agreement on cooperation between the Committee for Radio and Television and the Cuban Radio and Television Institute was signed in Warsaw today. [LD270255 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 2100 GMT 26 Oct 79 LD]

COOPERATION WITH BELGIAN PLANTS--The Polish-Belgian talks on cooperation between small and medium industrial plants have ended in Warsaw. [no dates given] During the talks Poland presented proposals on cooperation in economic chemicals, toys, fancy metal articles, fixtures, household tools and articles and wooden and glass products. Cooperation will help increase Polish exports to Belgium and to enrich the Polish market with many attractive products. The Belgian delegation was received by Minister of Finance Henryk Kisiel. [AU021952 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 1 Nov 79 p 1 AU]

VIETNAMESE CP DELEGATION VISIT--A delegation of the SRV has visited Poland. It included Tran Bach Dang, deputy head of the front and people's mobilization department of the Vietnam Communist Party Central Committee; Pham Van Hieu, deputy head of the religious affairs department of the Council of Ministers; and Nguyen Xuan Hong, worker of the Vietnamese Communist Party Central Committee. The delegation studied many aspects of our social life, especially problems of religious affairs policy as an element of promoting the people's moral-political unity in the construction of socialist Poland's prosperity. Stanislaw Kania, PZPR Politburo member and Central Committee secretary, received the delegation on 3 November. Teodar Palimaka, director of the Central Committee administration department, and Kazimierz Rakol, chief of the office for religious affairs, were present. [Text] [AU061332 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 5 Nov 79 p 1 AU]

OPERATIONS TO RESCUE MINERS--The operations to rescue the miners trapped in the "Silesia" coalmine in Czechowice-Dziedzice are continuing for the sixth day now. The direct underground access to the probable site of the trap is made most difficult by fires, but intensive efforts are continuing to reach the miners by a shaft drilled from the surface. [Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 6 Nov 79 p 1 AU]

CREDENTIALS PRESENTATION IN MANAGUA--Managua PAP--Ambassador Jozef Klasa has presented credentials accrediting him to the Republic of Nicaragua. Following the official ceremony, Jozef Klasa had a conversation with Sergio Ramirez and Moises Hassan, junta members, and Miguel de Escoto, minister of foreign affairs, on future cooperation between Poland and Nicaragua. [AU082008 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 7 Nov 79 p 2 AU]

WOJTASZEK INDIAN AMBASSADOR RECEPTION--PAP--Emil Wojtaszek, minister of foreign affairs, received on 6 October Mondalan Ramaseshler Sivaramakrishnan, ambassador of the Republic of India, who paid the former an introductory visit before assuming his mission. [AU082008 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 6 Nov 79 p 2 AU]

NEW PERUVIAN AMBASSADOR--PAP--On 7 November Emil Wojtaszek, minister of foreign affairs, received Mariano Pagador Puente, newly appointed ambassador of the Republic of Peru, who paid the former an introductory visit before assuming his mission in Poland. [AU101437 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 8 Nov 79 p 2 AU]

CSO: 2020

ROMANIA

ELECTIONS IN PARTY ORGANIZATIONS IN BUCHAREST SECTORS

Elections in Sectors 3, 6

Bucharest INFORMATIA BUCURESTIULUI in Romanian 15 Oct 79 pp 1, 3

[Excerpts] The reports and elections conferences of the party organizations of the Bucharest sectors have begun. During the conferences the members of the new party committees and auditing commissions and the delegates to the conference of the Bucharest party organization were elected and candidates for the Bucharest Municipality RCP Committee were designated. Meeting in their first plenary sessions, the new committees elected their bureaus and secretariats. Comrade Carolica Vasile was elected first secretary of the party committee of Sector 3 and the following comrades were elected secretaries: Mihail Stefanescu, Galaction Vlase, Vasile Vasile, and Iona Magdalena Vlad. Comrade Elena Nae was elected first secretary of the party committee of Sector 6 and comrades Gheorghe Istrate, Radu-Paul Paunescu, Iulian Milu and Diana Zefer were elected secretaries.

Elections in Sector 2

Bucharest INFORMATIA BUCURESTIULUI in Romanian 20 Oct 79 p 2

[Excerpts] Comrade Ion Popa was elected first secretary of the party committee in Sector 2. Comrades Ion Cociuba, Roland Eugen Ionescu, Marilena Preda and Polixenia Savu were elected secretaries.

Elections in Sectors 4, 5

Bucharest INFORMATIA BUCURESTIULUI in Romanian 22 Oct 79 p 2

[Excerpts] Comrade Maria Gheorghe was elected first secretary of the party committee of Sector 4 and comrades Stelian Anghel, Stan Sprinceana, Gheorghe Paduraru, and Maria Iepure were elected secretaries. Comrade Ion Popescu was elected first secretary of the party committee of Sector 5 and comrades Mihai Gheorghe, Ion Girtone, Elena Stanescu, and Aneta Diaconu were elected secretaries.

Elections in Sector 1

Bucharest INFORMATIA BUCURESTIULUI in Romanian 27 Oct 79 p 2

[Excerpts] Comrade Dumitru Gheorghe was elected first secretary of the party committee of Sector 1 and comrades Stefan Barceri, Marin Voinea, Ana Comanita, and Mioara Baltaretu were elected secretaries.

CSO: 2700

AMENDED DECREE ON ALLOCATIONS FOR CHILDREN PUBLISHED

Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 83, 23 Oct 79 pp 2-5

Decree No 246/1977 of the State Council of the Socialist Republic of Romania on the State Allocation for Children

Text State Council Decree No 246/1977
on the State Allocation for Children*

Within the framework of the party's policy of multilateral development of the socialist society, the state devotes special care to the rearing and education of children, to their multilateral formation and training for work and life.

Within this concern, besides the conditions that are created for all children with a view to their physical and mental development, the state grants material support to families with children, allocating significant amounts of monetary funds for this purpose, in the form of the state allocation for children.

In order to improve the legal framework for granting this allocation, the State Council of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees:

**Chapter I
General Provisions**

Article 1. (1) In the Socialist Republic of Romania the state aids and supports families with children, for the purpose of creating all the conditions for providing for the rearing and education of children and the multilateral training of the younger generation for work and life.

* Republished on the basis of Article 3 of State Council Decree No 359 of 18 October 1979, published in this issue of the bulletin.

State Council Decree No 246/1977 was published in BULETINUL OFICIAL AL REPUBLICII SOCIALISTE ROMANIA, Part I, No 79, 1 August 1977.

(2) Within the framework of the material support that families receive, the state grants the state allocation for children of up to 16 years of age, found in the family's care, under the conditions of the present decree.

Article 2. (1) The state allocation for children is granted monthly, in varying amounts, in relation to the number of children found in the family's keeping, the incomes of the holder of the allocation, and the area, urban or rural, in which the holder resides.

(2) Persons who receive the state allocation for children are obligated to use it exclusively for the purpose of taking care of children.

Chapter II

The Amount of the State Allocation for Children

Article 3. (1) The amounts, as well as the income ceilings and the number of children in relation to which the state allocation for children is established, are the following:

		Ceilings of monthly incomes (lei)				
		up to 1,850	1,851-2,400	2,401-2,800	2,801-3,350	3,351-4,450
		B:				
		up to 1,600	1,601-2,050	2,051-2,500	2,501-3,050	3,051-4,000
For the 1st child	urban	220	180	150	150	150
	rural	150	110	90	90	90
For the 2d child	urban	230	190	170	150	150
	rural	170	130	100	90	90
For the 3d child	urban	260	220	190	170	150
	rural	190	150	130	100	90
For the 4th child	urban	260	220	190	170	150
	rural	190	150	130	100	90
For the 5th child	urban	260	220	190	170	150
	rural	190	150	130	100	90
For the 6th child	urban	280	240	220	190	180
	rural	220	180	150	130	110
For the 7th child	urban	300	260	230	200	190
	rural	230	190	170	140	130
For the 8th child	urban	310	270	240	220	200
	rural	240	200	180	150	140
For the 9th child and the following ones	urban	320	280	260	230	220
	rural	260	220	190	170	150

(2) The income ceilings in Letter A of the table provided in Paragraph 1 apply to worker personnel and pensioners who have received the raise in salaries and pensions in the 1979-1980 second stage.

(3) The income ceilings in Letter B of the table provided in Paragraph 1 apply to worker personnel and pensioners up to the raise in salaries and pensions in the 1979-1980 second stage.

Article 4. (1) The state allocation for children, in the amount established for the urban area, is also granted to persons residing in component localities of municipalities and cities. The persons stipulated in the appendix to the present decree also receive the allocation in the amount established for the urban area.

(2) The state allocation for children, in the amount established for the rural area, is also granted to persons residing in suburban communes and in villages belonging to municipalities and cities.

(3) The amount of the state allocation for children changes whenever there is a change in the number of children, the incomes of the holder, the urban or rural area in which the holder lives, and the other conditions in relation to which the allocation is granted.

Chapter III

The Conditions for Granting the State Allocation for Children

Article 5. (1) The state allocation for children is granted to those families in which one or both parents are:

a) Employed with a work contract of indeterminate duration in state socialist enterprises, as well as to other persons who, according to law, are equivalent to them;

b) Regular military personnel, students in military schools and in military institutions of higher education;

c) Military personnel on full-term or short-term active duty;

d) Teaching personnel employed for a school year;

e) Students in daytime higher education and doctoral candidates on scholarship;

f) State social security pensioners, military pensioners and IOVR pensioners /invalids, orphans and war widows/, recipients of social aid. Children of deceased pensioners receive the state allocation if they have not passed the age of 16 years.

(2) The state allocation for children is granted to the husband. In the case in which only the wife fits into the categories stipulated in Paragraph 1, the state allocation for children is granted to her.

Article 6. (1) The state allocation is granted for children of up to 16 years of age found in the family's keeping. For those who have contracted a

first- or second-degree disability before reaching this age, the allocation is granted up to the reaching of the age of 18 years.

(2) The following are entitled to the state allocation under the same conditions as children born from the marriage of the parents:

a) Children from an earlier marriage of one of the spouses and found in his (her) care;

b) Children from outside the marriage, if they have been acknowledged or if their filiation has been established by means of a judicial decision;

c) Adopted children;

d) Children accepted for rearing, on the basis of their assignment by the competent bodies, in accordance with the legal provisions.

(3) In the case of divorced parents and in the case of children from outside the marriage who have been acknowledged or whose filiation has been established by means of a judicial decision, the allocation is granted to the parent who has the child in his (her) care.

(4) If the parent who has the child in his (her) care does not fit into the categories of persons who receive the allocation, it is granted to the other parent, if he (she) meets the conditions provided by law.

Article 7. (1) The state allocation for children is granted, changes or ceases beginning with the month after the one in which the conditions provided by law are met.

(2) For persons newly employed in labor, the state allocation is granted after 3 months of employment with a work contract of indeterminate duration.

(3) For persons whose work contract has ceased through their fault, under the conditions in which, according to law, the seniority is interrupted, the allocation is granted only after 3 months from the date of reemployment with a work contract of indeterminate duration, and for the next 6 months the amount of the allocation is reduced by 50 percent.

Article 8. For persons who have received the state allocation the right to an extension is maintained up to reemployment in labor, but not for more than 3 months from the date of cancellation of the work contract, if this is due to the reduction of personnel or the restriction of activity and in the respective period they have a right, according to law, to remuneration.

Article 9. (1) The assigned or calculated basic wage, as the case may be, and, respectively, the basic wage for regular military personnel, to which the sums achieved, under the conditions of the law, from other rights to remuneration are also added, are taken into consideration in determining the

incomes in relation to which the state allocation rights are established for children of persons employed with a work contract.

(2) In the case of persons who do piecework, the state allocation for children is granted in relation to the basic wage, regardless of the income achieved.

(3) For persons employed with a reduced work program under the conditions of the law, the allocation rights are determined in relation to the assigned basic wage corresponding to the full work program.

Article 10. For pensioners, the right to the state allocation for children is established in relation to the amount of pension or social aid, and for persons called to fulfill military obligations, it is established in relation to the rights to remuneration or compensation, as the case may be, according to law.

Article 11. (1) The state allocation is not granted for children who:

a) Are students in schools that provide them full support from the state;

b) Achieve incomes of their own, being apprentices at the workplace or employed in labor in compliance with the legal provisions.

(2) The state allocation for children is not granted concomitantly with a scholarship, with the entitled persons being able to choose the latter or the allocation.

(3) For children found in social welfare institutions, the state allocation is granted only in the case in which the parents completely pay the cost of support.

Article 12. Persons who have had more than 12 days of leave without pay, leaves of absence or unexcused absences from the start of the calendar year do not receive the state allocation in the month in which a new leave of absence, leave without pay or unexcused absence occurs.

Article 13. Persons found on leaves without pay in January and February, as a result of the reduction of activity because of unfavorable weather conditions, receive the state allocation for children in these months too. The payment of the allocation by the subordinate units is approved by ministries, the other central bodies, and the executive committees of the county people's councils and that of the municipality of Bucharest.

Chapter IV

Establishment and Payment of the State Allocation for Children

Article 14. (1) The rights to the state allocation for children are established by the unit that, according to the provisions of the present decree, is obligated to pay the allocation.

(2) The request for the granting of the state allocation for children is verified by the commission for pensions and social security in the unit and is approved by the leadership of the unit, after the making of the preventive financial inspection.

(3) The payment of the state allocation for children is done by:

- a) The units that pay the rights to remuneration, for persons employed in labor;
- b) The bodies for social security and pensions, for pensioners;
- c) The institutions at which they are enrolled, for students in daytime higher education and for graduates up to their employment in labor, within the period established by means of the assignment order;
- d) The units at which they worked, for military personnel on full-term active duty and military personnel on short-term active duty who on the date of induction were employed with a work contract of indeterminate duration;
- e) The military centers, for students in military schools and in military institutions of higher education;
- f) The units where they receive the monetary rights, according to law, for persons called to satisfy military purposes, other than military service on full-term active duty.

(4) In order to obtain the allocation rights, the requesters turn in the necessary documents at the unit that is, according to the present decree, to make the payment to them.

Article 15. (1) Persons who receive the state allocation for children are obligated to communicate to the unit, within 10 days, any change occurring in their status or in the number or the status of the children that is of a nature to change their allocation rights.

(2) In order to avoid illegal payments of allocations, the social welfare institutions in which children of up to 16 years of age are boarded are obligated to announce this situation to the unit where the parent or person who has the child in his (her) care is employed.

Article 16. (1) The rights to the state allocation for children are granted only from the date of their establishment in accordance with the provisions of the present decree.

(2) In the case of the payment of the allocation without legal grounds, the sums paid for a period of 12 months can be sought under the conditions provided by the labor code. If the act that caused such a payment constitutes an infraction, the sums are recovered for the whole period for which they were paid.

Chapter V
Transitional and Final Provisions

Article 17. The provisions of the present decree will also apply accordingly to personnel in the artisan and consumer cooperative systems, to writers, artists, painters, sculptors and composers who are members of the creative unions, to members of bar associations and to personnel of other public organizations, with the payment of the allocation being made from their own funds.

Article 18. (1) The present decree goes into effect on 1 September 1977, with the exception of Article 3, which is to be applied along with the second stage of increase in the state allocation for children, in 1979.

(2) On the date that the present decree goes into effect, Decree No 285/1960, with the later amendments, and any other contrary provisions are repealed.

Appendix

The Categories

of Persons Who Receive the State Allocation for Children in Amounts
Corresponding to the Urban Area, Regardless of the Area in Which They Live

1. Persons employed in enterprises subordinate to ministries and other central bodies in the branches of mining, drilling, petroleum and methane gas, ferrous metallurgy, nonferrous metallurgy, fireproof materials, machine building, electric power, chemistry, viscose, glass and ceramics, building-assembly, paper and pulp, cement, construction materials, wood, printing, textiles, garments, footwear, leather and rubber, food, logging, railroads and air, sea, river and road transportation, and persons employed in enterprises for preindustrialization and purchases within the Central for Preindustrialization and Purchases under the guidance and control of the Ministry of Light Industry who perform their activity in rawhide warehouses and participate regularly in carrying out the processes of sorting, preindustrialization and formation of lots of rawhide.

2. Persons employed in units subordinate to the Ministry of Agriculture and the Food Industry:

Centrals, county trusts of state agricultural enterprises, state enterprises and their subunits subordinate to the Department of State Agriculture;

Experimental teaching stations within the Department of State Agriculture;

Trusts and stations for agricultural mechanization;

Machine enterprises of agriculture and the food industry;

Units for the breeding and fattening of animals;

Strain-testing centers;

Units and subunits subordinate to the National Center for Breeding and Qualification of Thoroughbred Horses;

Units for agricultural and sericultural research and production;

Enterprises for the production and industrialization of vegetables and fruit, production sections, farms, hothouses and heliogreenhouses in hothouse enterprises; and hothouses and heliogreenhouses in vegetable and fruit enterprises subordinate to the Vegetable and Fruit Central.

3. Persons in enterprises subordinate to executive committees of people's councils in the branches of building-assembly, construction materials and mining.

4. Medical, health and pharmaceutical personnel.

5. Regular military personnel and civilian personnel in the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of the Interior.

6. Chairmen, vice chairmen and secretaries of executive bureaus and executive committees of communal, city, municipal, sector and county people's councils.

7. Students in daytime higher education and students in military schools and in military institutions of higher education.

8. Persons at the Central Institute of Physics and subordinate units on the Magurele platform under the subordination of the State Committee for Nuclear Energy.

9. Persons on sites who perform geological and drilling work of the Institute for Hydropower Studies and Designs under the subordination of the Ministry of Electric Power.

10. Persons in budgetary units subordinate to the Department of Civil Aviation.

11. Persons employed at the Directorate for National Cultural Heritage under the subordination of the Council for Socialist Culture and Education who perform building-assembly work."

12. Persons employed in units under the guidance and control of the General Directorate of State Reserves.

* The Directorate for National Cultural Heritage was dissolved by means of State Council Decree No 442/1977, published in BULSTINUL OFICIAL, No 127, 28 November 1977, with its duties being given to the Council for Socialist Culture and Education.

13. Persons employed at stockfarms for experimental animals, in the communes of Cernica and Turnari and the municipality of Bucharest, of institutes of medical scientific research subordinate to the Academy of Medical Sciences.

14. Personnel of experimental teaching stations subordinate to the Ministry of Education and Instruction.

15. Persons whose right to the state allocation was maintained after the takeover of the Cimpina Sulfuric Acid Section in the Valea Calugareasca Chemical Fertilizer Combine by the Cimpina "23 August" Local Industry Combine and of the Bucharest Enterprise for Prototypes of Agricultural Machinery, Equipment and Installations (IPMA) by the Bucharest Research and Design Institute for Agricultural Machinery, for the time that they are employed in the respective section or institute, as the case may be.

Note:

1. If within a unit or central there are sections, subunits or units, without a legal personality, from different branches of activity, they follow, as far as the amount of the allocation is concerned, the policy of the unit to which they belong, regardless of the system of remuneration that is applied in the respective subunits.

2. In the case of the transfer of an enterprise from the subordination of one body to the subordination of another body, the allocation is granted from the respective date, in accordance with the new situation.

3. The assignment of enterprises of local subordination to one of the branches in the present appendix is established by means of the decision of the executive committees of the county people's councils and that of the municipality of Bucharest. In the case when in an enterprise of local subordination there are sections, subunits or departments from different branches, the provisions of the present appendix are applied only to the sections, subunits or departments in the branches mentioned in Point 3 of the appendix.

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ROMANIA

BRIEFS

MINISTERIAL CHANGES--The President of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees that Comrade Ion Chesa is relieved of his position as deputy of the metallurgical industry and director general of the Galati iron and steel industrial central; Comrade Iginio Pavoni is relieved of his position as deputy minister of the metallurgical industry; Comrade Gheorghe Deliu is appointed deputy minister of the metallurgical industry; Comrade Gheorghe Gheorghiu is appointed deputy minister of the metallurgical industry. [Excerpts] [Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 86, 7 Nov 79 p 3]

PEOPLES COUNCIL APPOINTMENT--Inasmuch as the position of chairman of the executive committee of the people's council of Dolj County has become vacant, on the basis of Article 72 of Law No 57/1968 on the organization and operation of the peoples councils, the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees that Comrade Miu Dobrescu is delegated to fill the position of chairman of the executive committee of the people's council of Dolj County. [Excerpts] [Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 85, 2 Nov 79 p 1]

RADIOTELEVISION APPOINTMENTS--The President of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees that Comrade Valeriu Pop is relieved of his position as director general of Romanian Radiotelevision; Comrade Alexandru Ionescu is appointed director general of Romanian Radiotelevision; Comrade Iuliu Fejes is relieved of his position as deputy director general of Romanian Radiotelevision; Comrade Alexandru Szekeres is appointed deputy director general of Romanian Radiotelevision. [Excerpts] [Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 85, 2 Nov 79 p 2]

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